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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Institutional Owners and Competitive Rivalry. (August 2008) 
 
Brian L. Connelly, B.S., Rutgers University;  
M.S., Johns Hopkins University;  
M.B.A., Indiana University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Laszlo Tihanyi 
 
 
 Scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of institutional owners in 
the life of the firm and have sought to explain how and when these owners influence 
firm-level strategies. In spite of evidence that these owners can and do affect broad 
strategies, there is little empirical support for the extent to which institutional investors 
involve themselves at the level of strategic competitive actions that firms undertake. This 
raises the question: “How do different types of institutional investors affect strategic 
competitive activity between firms?” Further, owners have a unique bearing on 
competitive activity insofar as they can simultaneously influence firms that are 
competing with each other. Therefore another important question is: “How are the 
relationships between institutional investors and strategic competitive activity affected 
when those investors hold stakes in both the focal firm and their competitor?” 
 Borrowing from the accounting literature, this dissertation classifies institutional 
owners into three groups based on their historical trading behavior: transient, dedicated, 
and quasi-indexer. Findings from examination of the ownership holdings and strategic 
competitive activity of thirty-six Fortune 500 rivalries over the years 1997-2006 provide 
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insight into these questions. High levels of dedicated institutional ownership are 
associated with greater strategic competitive activity whereas high transient institutional 
ownership is associated with low strategic competitive activity. The relationship between 
dedicated ownership and strategic competitive activity is moderated by common 
ownership of a focal firm and its rival. As dedicated ownership of the focal firm and its 
rival increase together, strategic competitive activity is reduced. The results presented 
here change the way we apply agency theory to explain firm governance. For competitive 
dynamics researchers, this study points to a previously unexplored means by which firms 
are motivated to engage, or not engage, in competitive activity. This study also has broad 
implications for managers, investors, and policymakers. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Firms exist in a competitive environment. Over the past two decades, researchers 
have directed attention to the specific moves and countermoves made by competitors 
within industries as they maneuver for advantageous market position (Chen & 
Macmillan, 1992; 1985). Studies show that competitive behavior has important 
implications for firm performance. For example, aggressive firms may gain market share 
from less competitively aggressive firms (Chen & Macmillan, 1992). At the same time, 
competitive aggressiveness holds the potential of reducing long-term profitability for all 
firms in an industry (Gimeno & Woo, 1999). Understanding the circumstances that 
intensify or deter competitiveness in an industry is, therefore, important to managers and 
their firms. 
Research has shed light on a number of determinants of firm competitive action. 
For example, the competitive aggressiveness of firms is driven, in part, by market 
structure (Chen, 1996), top management team (TMT) tendencies (Hambrick, Cho, & 
Chen, 1996), and various organizational characteristics (Ferrier, 2001). Competitive 
dynamics research suggests three behavioral drivers influence a firm’s decision to act 
competitively: awareness, motivation, and capability (Chen, 1996; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 
2007). Predictive theory of competitive behavior has mainly examined factors that make 
firms increasingly aware of competitive behavior (e.g., TMT heterogeneity and  
 
This dissertation follows the style of the Academy of Management Journal.  
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multimarket competition) and increasingly capable of initiating competitive behavior 
(e.g., past performance and financial slack) (Ferrier, 2001). These studies have yielded 
valuable insights, but have led to an emphasis on environmental and organizational 
explanations of firm competitive strategy (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001). Scholars 
have devoted less attention to motivation. 
Motivation “accounts for the incentives that drive a firm to undertake action” 
(Smith et al., 2001: 320). Competitive dynamics literature has looked primarily at 
external factors to describe a firm’s motivation to compete or not compete (Ferrier, 
Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Mas-Ruiz, Nicolau-Gonzalbez, & Ruiz-Moreno, 2005). For 
example, Chen’s (1996) theoretical integration of competitor analysis and interfirm 
rivalry describes how market commonality influences a firm’s motivation to compete. 
Higher market commonality between rival firms reduces the extent to which firms initiate 
competitive actions (Gimeno, 1999). At the same time, when a rival engages in 
competitive activity, it motivates the focal firm to do the same (Chen, 1996). For this 
reason, some have used attack volume, as defined by Ferrier (2001), as a proxy for 
motivation to engage in competitive activity (e.g., Chen et al., 2007). Others have begun 
to suggest there may be internal factors that also incent managers to compete, such as 
executive compensation (Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005) and internal reward systems 
(Golden & Ma, 2003). However, the literature has not yet incorporated the influence of 
corporate governance structures on a firm’s motivation to compete. 
One form of governance that may be an important motivating, or de-motivating, 
influence on competition between firms is firm ownership. Investors buy shares in firm 
stock with the goal of accomplishing particular financial objectives. To ensure that firms 
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pursue goals that are consistent with those objectives, research suggests that owners take 
an active interest in the strategies firms adopt (e.g., David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; 
Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002). Some owners desire their firms to take actions that 
provide immediate gains, others prefer actions that generate new growth opportunities 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), and still others may be so broadly 
invested that they desire to see all firms in an industry succeed. Owners, therefore, are 
likely to be interested in the way that firms in their portfolio compete with each another. 
Their interests may not be the same as those of managers or directors, because owners are 
concerned not only with competitiveness of the firm, but also with competitiveness of a 
selection of firms.  
 One set of owners that has captured significant scholarly attention, owing to their 
influence over firms and firm strategies, is institutional owners (David et al., 2001). 
About 75% of NYSE trading equity is held by institutional investors (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, 
& Dalton, 2008). From an agency perspective, researchers have argued they are better 
monitors than other investors because they have access to better information and more 
resources at their disposal (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). A number of studies have 
indicated there are important differences between types of institutional investors, and 
these differences explain the way that institutional investors affect firm strategies 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). Therefore, this 
dissertation asks, “how do different types of institutional investors affect competitive 
activity between firms?” Further, owners have a unique bearing on competitive activity 
insofar as they can simultaneously influence firms that are competing with each other. 
This raises another important question: “how are the relationships between institutional 
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investor types and competitive activity affected when institutional investors hold stakes 
in both the focal firm and their competitor?” 
 This dissertation unfolds in four parts. The first is a conceptual development that 
lays the groundwork for theory building. It begins with identification of gaps in 
competitive dynamics research, including a lack of research examining the influence of 
governance mechanisms. This is followed by a brief review of agency theory and 
discussion of how institutional investors govern firm actions using agency theoretic 
devices of exit, voice, and loyalty. This includes discussion of how the classification of 
institutional investors has progressed in both the management and accounting literatures, 
and how these classifications are important to firm strategies. This leads to the next 
section, hypothesis development, which builds on the conceptual development. I put 
forward specific postulates about how one particular classification of institutional 
investors, based on their trading behavior, describes how institutional investors use 
different agency mechanisms to incent or restrict competitive activity. I also develop 
hypotheses for situations where particular types of institutional investors own stakes in 
both a focal firm and its main competitor.  
The next two sections describe how to measure the hypotheses using a sample of 
large U.S. firms and discuss results of the analysis. The data used in this study span 
across 10 years and 36 industries to capture the influence of different types of 
institutional investors on firm competitive activity. Some clear trends emerge. Perhaps 
most importantly, this study shows that institutional investors can and do involve 
themselves in the life of firms in which they invest. Interest in the competitive activity of 
firms depends on the type of institutional investor; some encourage competition while 
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others appear to discourage it. More so, these relationships can change when institutional 
owners maintain significant holdings of both firms in a competitive rivalry. Analyzing 
these relationships in a variety of ways (i.e., random effects, fixed effects, and multilevel 
modeling) and with different operationalizations (i.e. two different operationalizations of 
the dependent variable) yielded robust results. This study could have far-reaching 
implications, so the dissertation ends with discussion of how these results add to what we 
know about governance and competitive dynamics and also considers what this means for 
managers and public policy.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Competitive Dynamics 
Competitive dynamics is the study of firm actions and reactions (Ketchen, Snow, 
& Hoover, 2004). The ideas underlying competitive dynamics originated with 
Schumpeter (1934) who described the market process of competition wherein the creative 
actions of challengers whittle away at (i.e., attempt to destroy) a leader’s position. 
Commonly known as “creative destruction,” the goal of these competitive moves and 
countermoves was to sabotage the profits of rival firms or even threaten their very 
survival. Empirical research began in the late 1980s when scholars began to examine the 
interplay and consequences of product moves and countermoves as firms jockey for 
position in the marketplace (e.g., Bettis & Weeks, 1987; Macmillan, McCaffery, & 
Vanwijk, 1985).  
The real emergence of this literature, though, came about in the 1990s when 
researchers found that competitive behavior has important effects on firm performance. 
Smith, Grimm, Chen, and Gannon (1989) were at the forefront of this literature stream 
with their identification of characteristics of competitive actions that evoked fast response 
times. A series of studies on the U.S. airline industry then emerged that sought to 
determine the antecedents and consequences of competitive actions and reactions (Chen 
& Hambrick, 1995; Chen & Macmillan, 1992; Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen, Smith, &  
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Grimm, 1992; Hambrick et al., 1996; Miller & Chen, 1994; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & 
Chen, 1991). These studies served as the foundation for competitive dynamics research 
and determined, in large part, what we know of when firms take actions and formulate 
responses, and what type of actions and responses they form.  
It is important to recognize that, despite the groundbreaking contributions of these 
studies, their common focus on the U.S. airline industry raises some questions about 
generalizability of their conclusions. Although more recent competitive dynamics 
research has started to broaden to other industries (e.g., Cool, Roller, & Leleux, 1999; 
Ferrier, 2001; Yu & Cannella, 2007), the literature would benefit from empirical studies 
that reach beyond a single-industry. In their recent review of competitive dynamics 
research, Ketchen and colleagues remark that “the ultimate objective of such research 
should be establishing generalizability, so the most useful studies will be those that 
compare two or more scenarios. Also, this stream would benefit from longitudinal 
research” (2004: 794). For this reason, I expect studies that examine the interaction 
between firms in multiple industries across several years could provide an important 
contribution to the competitive dynamics literature.  
Further, competitive dynamics research has sought to describe specific types of 
competitive actions by categorizing them as either strategic or tactical (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Porter, 1980). Smith et al. (1992: 63) define these terms as follows: 
Strategic actions involve significant commitments of specific, distinctive resources 
and are difficult to implement and reverse … Tactical actions, on the other hand, are 
often designed to fine-tune strategy; they involve fewer and more general resources 
than strategic actions, are easier to implement, and are often more reversible. 
 
One limitation of the current body of competitive dynamics research is its focus on 
tactical (vis-à-vis strategic) competitive actions. Empirical competitive dynamics 
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research has developed well established relationships about the antecedents and 
consequences of tactical competitive activity (Ferrier, 2001), but has devoted less 
attention to differences that may emerge when examining strategic competitive actions. 
Strategic and Tactical Actions. The definition provided above, combined with 
subsequent research, points to a number of characteristics of competitive actions that 
mark them as strategic rather than tactical. Foremost, strategic actions involve a 
significant commitment of specific resources, such as an investment in fixed assets 
(Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986). Strategic actions are also less reversible than tactical 
actions (Chen & Macmillan, 1992). Porter (1980: 75) describes how “the behavior of 
competitors provides signals in a myriad of ways. Some signals are bluffs, some are 
warnings, and some are earnest commitments to a course of action.” The extent to which 
an action is irreversible contributes to its interpretation as an earnest, strategic 
commitment rather than a bluff or warning. A somewhat related characteristic of strategic 
actions is that they are difficult to implement, which also makes them more difficult to 
imitate (Hambrick et al., 1996). Scholars also consistently recognize that strategic actions 
have longer time horizons than their tactical counterparts (Hambrick et al., 1996; Miller 
& Chen, 1996; Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). For example, Chen and colleagues (1992) 
write that “the effectiveness of strategic actions often remains uncertain for a long period 
of time.”  
Despite the popular use of this categorization, most empirical competitive 
dynamics research does not distinguish between strategic and tactical actions. The few 
studies that do are focused on the consequences of initiating different types of actions. 
Specifically, these studies consider the likelihood of response based on whether the 
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initiating action is strategic or tactical. The set of studies from the early 1990s on the U.S. 
airlines industry together demonstrated that strategic actions illicit fewer competitive 
responses than tactical actions (Chen & Macmillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Smith et al., 
1991). In their examination of competitive responses in the automotive industry, Yu and 
Canella (2007) differentiate between strategic and tactical actions, but here again the 
dependent variable was likelihood of response. So, although some studies have 
differentiated between strategic and tactical competitive actions, it has been with a view 
toward the consequences of initiating strategic rather than tactical competitive actions. 
Scholars have not yet asked questions about when and why firms initiate particular types 
of competitive actions. 
The distinction between strategic and tactical competitive actions is particularly 
important when considering the influence of firm shareholders. Firms operate in complex 
environments and shareholders are typically invested in many different firms, so it would 
not be practical for shareholders to involve themselves in daily tactical decisions. They 
may, however, be interested in strategic competitive actions for several reasons. For 
example, shareholders may be concerned about managerial opportunism, and monitoring 
or controlling strategic competitive activity is one way to ensure that managers are not 
leveraging firm assets toward their own interests. Also, shareholders may wish to ensure 
that strategic competitive actions would lead to an increase in the value of their holdings. 
Further, shareholders may be subject to hubris, similar to top managers, and therefore 
may feel that their own perspective on strategic competitive activity should be imposed 
on firm managers. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that shareholders will be 
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concerned with influencing the strategic competitive activity of firms in which they 
invest. 
Competitive Rivalry. An important first step in competitive dynamics research is 
to determine which firms are competing against one another. A body of research has 
examined market definition and drawn conclusions about factors that cause firms to 
consider themselves competitors (Chen, 1996; Porac & Thomas, 1990; Porac, Thomas, 
Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995). This dissertation goes beyond the issue of defining a 
firms’ competitors to explore competition between firms that are known to be in direct 
competition with each other. One line of research that examines how known competitors 
interact with each other is the study of industry leaders and their primary challengers, 
which are clearly competitive rivals (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999). 
Competitive rivalry is the specific consideration of firm dyads that take actions 
against each other to defend or improve market positions (Ferrier & Lee, 2002). Interest 
in competitive rivalry is rooted in Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, where he 
describes head-to-head rivalry between firms as “an incessant race to get or to keep ahead 
of one another” (Kirzner, 1973: 20). As firms strive for competitive advantage, they must 
develop strategies for gaining advantage over their rivals. As such, scholars have sought 
to measure competitive rivalry in order to study factors that influence it. Industry rivals 
constitute a particularly appropriate arena for competitive dynamics research because 
they allow us to isolate the intended target of competitive actions. That is, when two 
firms dominate an industry, competitive actions designed to gain market share for one 
firm will have the simultaneous effect of reducing market share of the rival firm (Ferrier 
et al., 1999). Therefore, competitive rivalries between dominant firms are a subset of 
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competitive dynamics that serve almost as a laboratory for studying actions and reactions 
between firm dyads. 
Mutual Forbearance. One way that rivalrous firms realize higher profits is by 
recognizing that continued competitive behavior brings mutual harm and tacitly agreeing 
to restrain competitive activity, or “mutually forbear” (Barnett, Greve, & Park, 1994). 
Scholars have mainly investigated this phenomenon in the context of multimarket contact 
(Baum & Korn, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996b; Young, Smith, Grimm, & Simon, 2000). 
Empirical studies in economics (Evan & Kessides, 1994) and strategy (Boeker, 
Goodstein, Stephan, & Murmann, 1997) consistently show that high levels of 
multimarket contact results in fewer initiated competitive actions. When firms compete in 
overlapping markets, they can retaliate from rivalrous actions either in the market where 
the move occurs or in other markets where there is contact. Increased potential for 
retaliation motivates each firm to forbear from rivalrous behavior (Feinberg, 1984). 
Baum and Korn (1999) argue that multimarket contact improves rivals’ ability to signal 
their intentions about competitive actions and responses. Stephan, Murmann, Boeker, and 
Goodstein (2003: 406) concur, noting that “high levels of contact ensure that signaling 
and competitive information is more accurately interpreted by market participants, 
enabling multipoint competitors to better coordinate their behavior.” In other words, for 
mutual forbearance to occur, it is important to have some mechanism for tacit collusion. 
Multimarket contact is one such mechanism. 
There is, however, very little research exploring other mechanisms that might 
foster mutual forbearance between rival firms. In particular, there may be characteristics 
of the firms that provide incentive to restrict competitive activity. Discussing mutual 
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forbearance, Golden and Ma (2003: 480) note that “the ability and desire to pursue these 
strategies may be limited to firms with certain specifiable characteristics.” These authors 
considered the internal organizational structures that promote mutual forbearance, 
suggesting that integrating mechanisms and internal rewards for cooperation both make 
for an ideal mutual forbearer (Golden & Ma, 2003). However, they stopped short of 
considering how different governance mechanisms might provide incentive or 
disincentive for rivals firms to engage in competitive activity.  
Summary. The study of competitive dynamics has developed over the past twenty 
years into a rich stream of research that has become central to strategic management 
literature. Scholars draw much of what we know about competitive dynamics from 
research in a few major industries, such as airlines and automobiles, which has prompted 
some to call for studies in multiple industries that will help to establish generalizability 
(Ketchen et al., 2004). Also, an emphasis on studying tactical competitive activity has left 
a gap in our understanding of strategic competitive actions, and in particular the 
antecedents of such actions. Competitive rivalry is a subset of competitive dynamics that 
explores actions and reactions between firm dyads. Rivals sometimes mutually agree to 
forbear, or limit competitive activity, and scholars have considered firm and inter-firm 
characteristics that would foster such forbearance. However, this research has not been 
extended to consider how governance mechanisms of firms in a rivalry might affect 
competitive actions, reactions, or mutual forbearance.  
Broadly speaking, corporate governance addresses all of the factors and forces 
that work to harmonize the interests of managers and shareholders (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990). Although governance is most typically associated with boards of 
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directors, there are a variety of other forces, both internal and external to the firm, that 
help to define whether the interests of shareholders are well served (Daily, Dalton, & 
Rajagopalan, 2003). A firm’s competitive activity is one area where managers and 
shareholders may have divergent interests. Therefore, an important scholarly 
consideration resides at the intersection of governance and competitive dynamics as we 
seek to understand when and why managers and shareholders may hold different views 
about competitive activity, and what may be done when those views diverge. Toward this 
end, the next section begins to address firm governance and the dominant theoretical 
perspective that has been used to explain the role of governance on firm strategies - 
agency theory. 
Agency Theory 
Within strategic management, agency theory is a frequently used theoretical lens 
that has successfully informed research on corporate governance (Dalton et al., 2008). 
This theory is concerned with the agency problem, which addresses two incongruities in 
the principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). The first arises when goals of the 
principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify 
whether the agent has behaved appropriately. The second incongruity is that of risk, a 
problem which arises when the principal and the agent have different attitudes toward 
risk and consequently may prefer different actions (Fama, 1980). Principals establish 
governance mechanisms to minimize agency concerns about incongruent goals and risk 
preferences (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The mechanisms that are used for reducing the agency problem provide a natural 
means for dividing research on corporate governance into four dominant literature 
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streams (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2007). The first considers boards of directors, and in 
particular their role in monitoring firm activities (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). A 
second stream examines the role of executive compensation as a governance mechanism 
that seeks to align the interests of managers and owners (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & 
Yoder, 2007). A third stream, the market for corporate control, is an external governance 
mechanism that comes into play when other mechanisms fail (Sinha, 2004). The fourth 
literature stream examines firm ownership as a form of governance and has received 
considerable research interest in accounting, finance (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001), and 
management (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003) journals. Shareholders have the 
ability to govern firm actions because of the collective power they hold in the form of 
outstanding shares. 
Although shareholders are empowered to monitor and control major corporate 
decisions (Bebchuk, 2005; Gillan & Starks, 2007), there are several obstacles to the 
effectiveness with which shareholders may function as a governance mechanism. One 
problem is diffusion of ownership. In general, a large number of small-scale owners 
makes it more difficult for those owners to effectively concentrate their actions. There are 
campaign costs associated with bringing diffuse owners together to form a common 
voice, making diffuse shareholders an inefficient form of governance. Diffuse ownership 
also provides weak monitoring because it reduces shareholder incentives to investigate 
the quality of corporate decision-making (Bebchuk, 2005). A single shareholder who 
owns only a fraction of the firm would not want to invest too much time and money in 
monitoring because they would derive only a portion of the benefits of good corporate 
decision-making. A second problem is that of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). 
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Shareholders hold imperfect knowledge about the kinds of actions that firms could and 
should take (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which limits their effectiveness as a governance 
mechanism and increases the likelihood they will impose decisions that will reduce 
shareholder wealth. A final problem is that of consistency. Inconsistency and unreliability 
in corporate decision-making can hinder long-term planning and bring about the need for 
more explicit contractual provisions with partners. A diffuse body of shareholders may 
impose sectional interests, reducing consistency and introducing a form of uncertainty for 
contracting partners.  
These obstacles together suggest that shareholders may be both inefficient and 
ineffective governors of firm actions. However, all shareholders are not equal. What 
makes institutional investors particularly interesting as a subset of shareholders is their 
unique ability to overcome common shareholder obstacles and effectively govern firm 
actions. These investors and their unique role in firm governance are described in the 
next section. 
Institutional Investors as a Form of Governance 
Institutional investors are a general class of equity holders that file 13-f Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports. The SEC requires that all institutions 
managing more that $100 million in equity must file a quarterly report listing all holdings 
that are greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. These investors include 
mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds (public, private, and corporate), banks, 
insurance companies, foundations, and endowments. The economic power and clout of 
institutional investors has risen steadily in recent decades as they have gained an 
increasing percentage of U.S. equities. In 1970 this group held 20% of U.S. equities, 
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increasing to 45% in 1990 and rising steadily to over 70% by the end of 2006 (Gillan & 
Starks, 2007). Further, this group accounts for ¾ of the trading in equities listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (Karmel, 2004). These figures suggest that 
institutional investors have the size and potential influence to capture manager’s 
attention, discipline ineffective managers, and affect firm strategies. 
The collective power and influence of institutional investors took a turn in 1985 
with the formation of two unifying groups: the Council of Institutional Investors (The 
Council) and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The Council is a group of 130 
pension funds that together control financial assets exceeding $3 trillion. Working 
together allows these investors to mutually benefit from common research and resources 
and apply collective pressure on firms to act in their interest. As such these institutional 
shareowners have a much greater voice today than they did 20 years ago 
(www.cii.org/about). ISS and its more recently-formed rival, Glass, Lewis, & Co., serve a 
broader constituency of clients, analyzing firms and providing extensive research services 
and vote recommendations for a wide range of institutional investors. These groups have 
facilitated the ability of institutional investors to better understand the firms in which they 
invest and more effectively influence those firms to act in the best interest of 
shareholders.  
There are several reasons why institutional investors are able to overcome 
obstacles to firm governance encountered by other shareholders. Clients of institutional 
investors sign over their voting rights, effectively centralizing the bargaining power of all 
those clients in a single entity and avoiding campaign costs. In fact, a number of 
institutional investors could even combine their bargaining strength because there are 
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fewer of them than there are general investors. With their large holdings, institutional 
investors also have both the incentives and the resources to monitor firm actions (Pound, 
1988). Institutional investors also benefit from membership in dedicated coordinating 
bodies, such as ISS and The Council, which gives them access to research and inside 
information not available to other investors (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). These 
organizations combine with institutional investors’ own professional staff to reduce the 
problem of bounded rationality and increase monitoring effectiveness. Consistency is 
also easier to achieve for institutional investors because they are run by a relatively small 
group with objectives that do not change much over time.  
As governers of firm actions, institutional investors serve as principals that have 
delegated activities of the firm to its managers, the agents. In this principal-agent 
relationship, institutional investors have three primary means of reducing agency 
concerns: exit, voice, and loyalty. In his classic work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, 
Hirschman (1970) described the ways in which people and businesses respond to 
organizational decline. In times of underperformance an organization’s constituents can 
opt out of difficulties by turning away (exit), they can use their leverage and resources to 
help restore performance (voice), or they can remain committed to the status quo 
(loyalty). These parallel the choices available to principals when agents do not act in 
accordance with their desires. Within the agency theory perspective, institutional owners 
are principals and firms are their agents. If owners perceive that firms are not acting in 
accordance with their objectives, they may exit, exercise their voice, or remain loyal. A 
strategy of loyalty suggests that the principal passively stays the course and does not take 
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specific action to align the interests of principal and agent. Exit and voice, however, are 
both active means of monitoring agent activity. 
Exit simply refers to “the Wall Street walk,” meaning the institutional owner sells 
their shares of the firm. Doing so disciplines firms for lack of compliance to owner 
preferences because each exit marginally reduces the value of the firm (Parrino, Sias, & 
Starks, 2003). Exit is not always a viable option, though, because once owners obtain a 
substantial percentage of a firm’s stock then it becomes difficult or impossible to 
liquidate the stock before its value declines. Also, in the case of owners such as 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) that has hundreds of billions 
of dollars to invest, their ability to exit is limited by their ability to find better alternatives 
in which to invest. Such owners, with massive total portfolios, may be forced to remain 
invested in firms which they would prefer to exit because they are already broadly 
invested in all the better alternatives of which they are aware.  
Therefore, firms that do not or cannot exercise their will through exit may do so 
through voice-based governance (Filatotchev & Toms, 2006), which applies pressure to 
align agent and owner objectives via different forms of activism. Research has shown that 
exercising voice can affect the types of strategies that firms undertake (David et al., 2001; 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). The most common means by which institutional investors 
exercise their voice is through each vote that they earn by virtue of being a shareholder. 
Coordinating bodies often provide voting guidelines to ensure that institutional investors 
are aware of important issues and increase their governing power by voting in unison. 
Voting power may be combined with the power to initiate shareholder proposals for even 
more effective governance. Fidelity, for example, announced in 2002 that if executive 
19 
 
compensation and firm performance were not sufficiently linked then it would vote 
against the firm’s directors. Proxy contests are another form by which institutional 
investors exercise voice. The costs of waging a proxy battle are high because the deck is 
stacked in management’s favor, so this method tailed off in the 1990s. However, it has 
recently gained momentum; there were thirty such contests in 2004, forty in 2005, and 
ninety-one in 2006.  
Besides voting-oriented forms of activism, institutional investors can also exercise 
their voice through other means. For example, some have used the media to pressure 
management to make changes (Schwab & Thomas, 1998). Others participate in direct 
negotiations with management or even publicly announce their opposition to 
management (David et al., 2001). Institutional investors may also engage in behind-the-
scenes discussions with management or directors. For example, Fidelity (with 10% 
ownership) and Highfields Capital Management (with 5% ownership) worked behind the 
scenes to sway the Mays family to endorse a buyout of Clear Channel Communications. 
After the board initially opposed the deal, the board’s turnaround came after a protracted 
battle and pressure from many of the company’s largest shareholders. In sum, there are a 
variety of means available to institutional investors by which they may make their voice 
heard. Useem aptly notes that “fifteen years ago, the CEO and CFO did not know major 
shareholders and really didn’t care. CEOs are now more accessible to money managers” 
(Ettore, 1996: 29). 
Institutional Investors and Firm Strategies 
Owing to the role of institutional investors in firm governance, some researchers 
have sought to establish a relationship between a firm’s percentage of shares held by 
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institutional investors and firm performance. Empirical evidence examining this 
relationship has been mixed (Dalton et al., 2008). However, meta-analytic findings 
suggest something more complex, because there may be moderating influences that 
change the nature of the relationship (Dalton et al., 2003). For example, relationships 
may be significant when researchers examine different types of institutional investors 
rather that institutional investors as a whole, or more specific firm outcomes rather than 
overall firm performance. In fact, scholars have found that institutional investors have 
significant influence on many specific firm-level strategies (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik, & 
Turk, 1991; Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988). These results 
are even more pronounced when researchers distinguish between different types of 
institutional investors, finding that some are more influential than others and different 
types are concerned with different outcomes (e.g., Johnson & Greening, 1999; 
Ramaswamy et al., 2002; Zahra, Neubaum, & Huse, 2000). The next two sections discuss 
the different types of institutional investors that researchers have explored and how they 
influence specific strategies. 
Classifying Institutional Investor Types. Advancing beyond aggregate 
institutional ownership, scholars have sought to distinguish between different categories 
of institutional investors. This is because different types of owners do not have the same 
investment objectives and are therefore likely to impose pressures on firms toward 
differing ends. One commonly used scheme categorizes institutional investors as 
“pressure-resistant,” “pressure-sensitive,” or “pressure-indeterminate” (Brickley et al., 
1988). This classification system is built around the notion that an institutional investor’s 
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ability to influence firm outcomes may be limited by the extent to which that investor 
depends on the firm for business.  
The dual activities of investment and economic business relationships may 
engender conflicts of interest. Pressure-sensitive institutions (e.g. financial institutions 
and insurance companies) have ongoing business relations with firms in which they 
invest. For these investors, there is a precarious balance between power over a firm due 
to their ownership stake and dependence on the firm due to their business activity. They 
are less likely to influence strategies because firms can retaliate for any unwanted 
pressure. Pressure-resistant institutions (e.g. public pension funds, mutual funds) do not 
have active business relationships. These investors have no conflict of interest. Therefore, 
they are better able to affect significant strategic decisions of firms in which they invest 
(Brickley et al., 1988; Kochhar & David, 1996). A third group, pressure-indeterminate 
institutional investors (e.g., corporate pension funds), are less clear. These firms do not 
necessarily have a direct business relationship with the firm but may be reluctant to 
influence firm actions for other reasons. 
In the strategic management literature, scholars are primarily concerned with 
those institutional investors that hold sway over firm strategies. Therefore, they have 
further categorized the most pertinent group, pressure-resistant investors, as being either 
professional investment funds or public pension funds (e.g., Johnson & Greening, 1999; 
Tihanyi et al., 2003). Doing so allows them to distinguish not only on the basis of 
business relations with the firm but also based on a number of other characteristics 
particular to the institutional investor.  
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Professional investment funds have a number of common characteristics. For 
example, they are averse to firms about which there is little information and they are 
sensitive to past returns (Falkenstein, 1996). The holdings in professional investment 
funds turn over relatively frequently, with average holdings being somewhat less than a 
year (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991). One reason is that fund managers are typically 
evaluated and compensated based on quarterly results, so they are often chasing short-
term performance gains. Therefore, professional investment funds have short time 
horizons They are also likely to rely on a relatively narrow set of secondary-source 
investment information rather than trying to go deep into the firm itself for information, 
again suggesting a tendency toward high visibility firms. Public pension funds, on the 
other hand, are more concerned with long-term yields and more forgiving of past 
performance declines (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991). To protect the long-term interests of 
their clients, they are broadly diversified across many firms. Time horizons are longer as 
these institutional investors usually follow a buy-and-hold approach to investing. Thus, 
we see some important distinctions between professional investment funds and public 
pension funds. This finer-grained examination of institutional investors has provided 
valuable insights about the influence of these investors on innovation (Hoskisson et al., 
2002), diversification (Tihanyi et al., 2003), and corporate social performance (CSP) 
(Johnson & Greening, 1999). However, more extensive categorization may explain 
additional variance because professional investment funds may have widely varying 
investment objectives. Accounting for the trading preferences of different professional 
investment funds may provide further insight. 
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Bushee (1998) has provided an alternative categorization of institutional investors 
based on detailed analysis of their observed investment decisions. He “classifies 
institutional investors into groups using the specific characteristics of institutional 
investor behavior that have been argued to increase the pressure on managers to 
manipulate earnings” (1998: 310). Using factor and cluster analysis, Bushee 
parsimoniously classifies owners into three types, consistent with Porter’s (1992) 
discussion of how institutional investors differ in their behavior and incentives. 
Specifically, Porter (1992) argues that “transient” institutional owners create pressure for 
myopic strategies. These owners hold stakes in many different firms and frequently trade 
in and out of firms based on financial value proxies such as current earnings. The 
likelihood that they will sell a firm’s stock in the event of disappointing financial news 
provides incentive to managers to avoid such disappointments and focus on short-term 
financial gains. The combination of short time horizons and diversified holdings makes it 
difficult for transient institutional investors to gather information about the long run value 
of firms in which they invest, causing managers of those firms to make myopic strategic 
decisions (Bushee, 1998). The broad holdings of transient owners also suggest that they 
will capture only a portion of the benefits of positive firm actions, making them less 
likely to invest their own resources to ensure that such actions occur. 
In contrast, Porter (1992) argues that “dedicated” owners alleviate these pressures 
because they maintain large, long-term holdings that are concentrated in a few firms. 
These owners have incentive to monitor managerial behavior and are able to understand 
richer and more complex information about firms in which they invest. Dedicated 
institutional owners are more likely to be tolerant of short-term earnings disappointments 
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as long as they are comfortable with long run value prospects. Even if dedicated 
institutional owners wanted to exit from firm ownership, it is difficult for them to do so 
because the value of the firm’s stock would be negatively affected by initial sell-off such 
that they would be unable to efficiently sell their entire portfolio. Therefore, these owners 
have added incentive to monitor managerial behavior and ensure they are making 
decisions that will create long run value for the firm. Dedicated institutional owners also 
have less diversified holdings. They own fewer firms and more of them. This makes them 
better able to monitor and understand the activities of firms in which they invest, and also 
appropriates a greater share of the benefits of positive firm outcomes. 
A third group, “quasi-indexers,” also use buy-and-hold strategies but are 
characterized by indexing and high portfolio diversification. This group has abdicated 
their monitoring role because their investment decisions follow broad indexes regardless 
of the strategies adopted by particular firms within those indexes. They are, therefore, of 
less interest from a governance perspective (Bushee, 1998). 
Using Porter’s (1992) descriptive terms, Bushee (1998; 2001) classifies all 
institutional owners into one of the three categories based on a variety of variables that 
analyze their investment tendencies and trading portfolios. These classifications are now 
well established in the accounting literature (Abarbanell, Bushee, & Raedy, 2003; Bushee 
& Noe, 2000; Ke & Petroni, 2004), but are only recently being applied in the 
management literature (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). The categorization method may, 
however, hold value for strategic management research because it delineates groups of 
institutional investors with reasonably homogenous incentives about how they will 
influence firm strategies (Bushee & Noe, 2000). Dedicated institutional investors will 
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have longer time horizons, buy-and-hold investment strategies, and larger shares of firms 
in which they invest. For this reason, they will favor strategies that provide value to the 
firm and will be more likely to intervene and apply pressure toward long-term objectives. 
Transient institutional investors are just the opposite, with shorter time-horizons, greater 
portfolio turnover, and a preference for near-term earnings potential. In fact, early 
indication from Bushee’s research suggests that transient (dedicated) institutional 
investors exhibit preferences for near-term (long-term) earnings, providing initial 
evidence that helps to “establish a link through which institutional investors could 
pressure managers into a short-term focus” (2001: 207). 
Influence on Specific Firm Outcomes. Perhaps the most highly investigated link 
between institutional investors and decisions within the firm has been examination of 
their influence on innovation. Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk (1991) initially found a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership concentration and corporate R&D 
spending. The relationship between institutional ownership and corporate risk taking was 
also found to be positive (Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996). Later research 
examined these relationships in more detail, finding that professional investment funds 
prefer external innovation whereas pension funds prefer internal innovation (Hoskisson et 
al., 2002). David, Hitt, and Gimeno (2001) added the notion that institutional investors 
affect R&D through the medium of activism. One important distinction that this line of 
research has discovered is that pressure-resistant institutions are positively associated 
with innovation, but pressure-sensitive institutions are negatively associated with 
innovation (Kochhar & David, 1996; Zahra et al., 2000). Zahra and colleagues note that 
“pressure-sensitive institutions are similar to Porter’s (1992) depiction of transient 
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ownership” (2000: 952). Bushee (1998) captured this difference more explicitly, finding 
that it is primarily dedicated and quasi-indexer investors that maintain R&D spending, 
whereas transient institutional investors are more likely to cut R&D spending in order to 
meet short-term earnings goals. Thus, scholars have found that different types of 
institutional owners influence firm innovation in opposite directions. 
Research on the relationship between ownership and corporate diversification has 
also received significant scholarly attention. Financial economists have often cited a 
landmark study by Amihud and Lev (1981) to show that the absence of large and 
powerful shareholders resulted in greater unrelated product diversification. Strategic 
management researchers, however, questioned these findings (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005) 
and found in reanalysis that ownership concentration was not related to product 
diversification (Lane, Cannella, & Lubatkin, 1998). More detailed analysis has found that 
pressure-sensitive institutional owners are associated with unrelated product 
diversification whereas the association is negative for pressure-resistant institutional 
owners (Ramaswamy et al., 2002). Institutional owners also appear to influence 
international diversification (Tihanyi & Ellstrand, 1998). In contrast to product 
diversification, all institutional owners seem to have some interest in international 
diversification (George, Wiklund, & Zahra, 2005), but groups of institutional owners are 
likely motivated to encourage international diversification for different reasons (Tihanyi 
et al., 2003). Thus, as was the case with innovation, detailed analysis of particular types 
of owners has uncovered important differences between groups as to how and why they 
influence corporate diversification. 
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Strategic management scholars have examined institutional influence on a number 
of other firm level outcomes. Early research showed that institutional investors foster 
restructuring activity in order to create more efficient organizations (Bethel & 
Liebeskind, 1993). They also reduce the likelihood of antitakeover defenses (poison pills) 
being adopted because such mechanisms are detrimental to shareholder value (Brickley et 
al., 1988; Mallette & Fowler, 1992). More recent research on the influence of 
institutional investors on corporate social performance (CSP) has followed the trend of 
classifying institutional investors to determine unique preferences. Initial findings 
showed that mutual funds are negatively associated with CSP whereas pension funds are 
positively associated with CSP (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Neubaum and Zahra 
confirmed these results, finding that  
long-term institutional owners, who usually support investments in long-term 
activities, may view CSP as necessary for sustainability and gaining competitive 
advantage. Short-term institutions, however, are likely to consider investments in 
CSP as costs that have limited benefits in the near term (2006: 113). 
 
Although these authors use a rudimentary operationalization of long-term institutional 
ownership as pension funds and short-term institutional ownership as mutual funds, their 
theoretical arguments are similar to those who classify investors by trading portfolio. 
 Summary. Together, the studies above have contributed a great deal to our 
understanding of firm governance and strategy development. We have learned that 
institutional investors do, indeed, have important effects on firm strategies, and that they 
are best understood as a heterogeneous group with respect to their strategic preferences. 
Some of the most significant effects are found when institutional owners are classified 
according to their trading habits, with clear distinctions seen between long-term and 
short-term investors. However, while there is evidence that institutional owners affect 
28 
 
broad strategies, scholars have not yet examined the extent to which these owners involve 
themselves at the level of strategic competitive actions. The literature would benefit from 
examination of the reach of institutional investors. Do they influence firms in a general 
way, with a guiding hand helping them decide which paths to choose, or do they have a 
more refined influence on each step along the path, affecting specific actions that firms 
undertake? Further, the focus in the literature to date has mainly been on the focal firm. 
That is, research questions have centered on how institutional investors in a particular 
firm affect some strategy of that firm. Scholars have yet to examine how institutional 
investors might affect the way firms interact and compete with one another. Scholars 
have also not explored the notion that institutional investors maintain broad portfolios 
that could include ownership of a firm and its competitors. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
 
There are several reasons to believe that institutional investors might influence 
competition between firms. Among the various corporate governance mechanisms 
studied, owners are unique in their ability to influence the firm through exit. Investors 
may buy or sell shares in the firm as they please, so firms that do not conform to an 
investor’s preferred competitive stance may be threatened with losing a portion of their 
ownership. Also, institutional investors vary in their time horizons. These differences are 
likely to result in different preferences for competitive intensity or competitive 
deterrence, similar to differences found in preferences for innovation and CSP. Dedicated 
and transient institutional owners have important differences in their motives and 
capabilities for monitoring strategic competitive activity and in the objectives they wish 
to pursue. Further, institutional investors hold broad portfolios that may include holdings 
of a firm’s competitors. This, too, is likely to have implications for the extent to which 
they would like to see those firms compete with one another. This last point suggests that 
research questions might be extended to ask how institutional ownership in one firm 
might affect strategy in a competitive firm. Therefore, in this section I develop specific 
postulates about how and when dedicated and transient institutional investors may affect 
strategic competitive behavior in inter-firm rivalries. 
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Direct Relationships 
Relational Investors, headed by Ralph Whitworth, is a good example of a 
dedicated institutional investor. The average market value of Relational’s holdings total 
around $26 billion, but this is all invested in fewer than a dozen firms at a time. 
Relational looks for firms that are undervalued and seeks to implement change that will 
enhance shareholder value. They look to implement actions that could turn the company 
around within two to three years, but their investment horizon often proves even longer. 
Recently Relational grabbed a $1.3 billion stake in Home Depot, a firm whose stock has 
remained stagnant during a six year period when shares of rival Lowes have nearly 
tripled. Relational urged strategy changes that led to the departure of Home Depot’s CEO 
This potent example sets the stage for the following arguments about the direct 
relationship between dedicated institutional investors and strategic competitive activity. 
Strategic competitive actions are aimed at providing above-average returns over a 
long time horizon. One reason is that, as compared to their tactical counterparts, these 
actions require more significant commitment of specific resources (Smith et al., 1991). 
This may be detrimental to the ability of the firm to compete in the short-term, because 
those resources are no longer available for tactical competitive activity. For example, 
Toyota’s expenditures on research and development and dedicated manufacturing 
equipment to support the firm’s desire to be the leading provider of hybrid vehicles is a 
strategic action. By redirecting financial and human capital toward establishing early 
market share in the small but growing hybrid vehicle market, Toyota cannot use those 
resources to compete more successfully in their established markets that may have a more 
near-term payoff. Further, by investing in specific assets firms make themselves more 
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susceptible to rapid changes in the industry environment (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Firms 
that undertake strategic competitive actions become less flexible in the near term because 
they are less able to shift and move resources to meet changing environmental demands.  
Strategic competitive actions are also difficult to implement (Hambrick et al., 
1996). If a competitive action were incremental or easy to put in place, then it would be 
readily imitated and would, by definition, not be strategic. Therefore, because they are 
difficult to implement, strategic competitive actions require more time to put in motion 
and take effect. However, rivals will also have greater difficulty arranging and applying 
the necessary resources to respond to strategic competitive actions. With competitors less 
able to respond, strategic competitive actions hold greater potential for long-term 
competitive advantage.  
Further, strategic competitive actions are less reversible than their tactical 
counterparts, which has a less obvious but equally important effect on the action’s ability 
to provide long-term competitive advantage. The cost of reversing an action signals rivals 
about a firms’ commitment to a particular strategic action (Chen & Macmillan, 1992). 
Porter remarks that “if a firm can convince its rivals that it is committed to a strategic 
move it is making or plans to make, it increases the chances that rivals will resign 
themselves to the new position and not expend the resources to retaliate or try to cause 
the firm to back down. Thus, commitment can deter retaliation” (1980: 101). If 
competitors, over time, resign themselves to the new position, the strategic competitive 
action will provide long-term competitive advantage to the firm. Thus, strategic 
competitive actions also hold potential for long-term competitive advantage because 
competitors are less motivated to respond. 
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Additionally, the buy-and-hold investment strategy of dedicated institutional 
investors may help firms to secure resources in support of costly strategic competitive 
actions with long-term payouts (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Perhaps the most obvious resource 
these investors provide is financial capital. Although dedicated and transient institutional 
investors alike provide access to financial resources for firms, dedicated institutional 
investors provide more “patient” capital that may be used for projects and investments 
that do not have a near-term payout (Bushee, 2004). Also, dedicated institutional 
investors provide firms with access to another resource that is sometimes overlooked: 
human capital. For example, billionaire investor Edward Lampert has a reputation for 
building positions in undervalued companies and then working behind the scenes to 
improve their performance. Such investors can help firms extract themselves from the 
trap of strategies aimed exclusively at next quarter profitability and instead focus on 
strategic competitive actions that provide long-term value (Bushee, 2001; Taylor, 1990). 
Dedicated institutional investors will also be interested in strategic competitive 
actions because their investment strategy gives them incentive to be more active monitors 
of firm activity. They exercise their will through voice rather than exit (David et al., 
2001). As such, they have more information about firms in which they invest and are 
better attuned to the kinds of activity that could potentially add value to those firms. The 
holdings of dedicated institutional investors are concentrated in a small number of firms, 
making them better able to understand the potential benefits of strategic competitive 
actions of those firms. This allows dedicated institutional investors to be more tolerant of 
short term investments, as long as they are confident of long run prospects. 
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H1: Dedicated institutional ownership is positively associated with the firm’s 
level of strategic competitive activity. 
 
Transient institutional investors are also likely to be interested in the performance 
gains that accompany strategic competitive actions, but will also be less tolerant of 
strategic competitive activity on the whole. Some level of strategic competitive activity is 
necessary to stay afloat in a competitive environment. Transient institutional owners are 
well aware of the competitive environment in which firms operate, and are therefore 
likely, to some extent, to encourage strategic competitive activity for firms in which they 
invest. However, as strategic competitive activity increases, transient institutional 
investors may become increasingly concerned with potentially negative, or at least 
uncertain, effects on short-term gains. The desire to see strategic competitive actions will 
diminish as such activity accumulates. Whereas low levels of strategic competitive 
activity will attract transient owners because it signals an ability to compete, increased 
levels of strategic competitive activity may be less appealing to transient owners because 
it signals that firm resources are tied up, inhibiting their ability to adapt to a changing 
environment. This suggests that transient institutional investors will foster strategic 
competitive activity, but at a decreasing rate. 
There are several reasons to suggest that transient institutional investors will 
discourage rising strategic competitive activity. First, the time horizon of their investment 
strategy indicates that they will become increasingly concerned as strategic competitive 
activity accumulates. Transient institutional investors favor stock value gains that result 
from short-term performance improvements, and are therefore likely to be wary of the 
short-term implications of increasing amounts of strategic competitive activity. Contrary 
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to dedicated owners, transient owners will not engage in activism to express concerns 
about increasing strategic competitive activity. Instead, they will discourage excessive 
strategic competitive activity by relying on quick entry and exit as their investment 
strategy. Because of their short-term holdings, transient investors will not be involved 
with a firm long enough to realize all of the gains associated with strategic competitive 
activity. Therefore, as strategic competitive activity increases they may turn their 
investment to other firms where they are more likely to capture the full value of firm 
actions. 
The compensation and incentive structure of transient owners is also oriented 
toward immediate gains; managers of these types of funds, for example, are frequently 
evaluated with regard to the funds’ performance (Baysinger et al., 1991). These pressures 
are likely to be passed on to firms in which they own shares. This will be consistent with 
some level of strategic competitive activity because such activity makes the firm more 
competitive and yields performance gains. However, increased levels of strategic 
competitive activity effectively push the window of expected gains further out because 
more and more firm resources become dedicated to long-term objectives. As the window 
of expected returns moves outward, fund managers may become concerned that gains 
will not be realized on their watch. So, an increasing amount of strategic competitive 
actions may be frowned upon because such actions do not alleviate the pressure for short-
term financial returns. Also, transient institutional investors are usually in fierce 
competition for clients (Hsu & Koh, 2005). If a transient institutional investor shows a 
single quarter with a loss or even below-average performance, they stand in danger of 
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losing clients. Therefore, these investors cannot allow the window of potential gains to be 
pushed out too far because doing so would risk losing their own clientele. 
Transient institutional investors also may become increasingly less tolerant of 
strategic competitive actions because they are poor monitors of firm activity.  The stakes 
they hold in firms are smaller than that of dedicated owners, making it more difficult to 
gather and understand strategic information about firms in which they invest. With their 
more diversified holdings, they cannot monitor strategic activity but instead must rely on 
financial value proxies. Therefore, they are more likely to sell a firms’ stock when 
increasing strategic competitive activity causes the firm to fall short of short-term 
earnings goals. At the same time, transient institutional investors may be better monitors 
of financial indicators across the industry because their frequent trades require them to be 
cognizant of alternative investment opportunities. Armed with an acute awareness of the 
financial performance of a wide universe of firms, transient institutional owners may shift 
to alternative investments as strategic competitive activity increases in the focal firm. In 
short, transient owners are interested in the performance benefits of strategic competitive 
activity, but their reliance on financial indicators imposes limits on the extent to which 
they will tolerate such activity because they become increasingly less able to understand 
the potential gains as strategic competitive activity increases. These arguments suggest 
the following relationship: 
H2: Transient institutional ownership is curvilinearly associated with the firm’s 
level of strategic competitive activity; it is positive, but at a decreasing rate. 
 
Board Representation 
Returning to the earlier example of Relational Investors, Whitworth’s investment 
arm frequently attempts to take over a position on the board of directors of firms in which 
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it invests. Having acquired a large stake in Sovereign Bancorp in 2005, Whitworth 
himself captured a seat on the board. Within six months, the CEO was fired and the firm 
engaged in a number of strategic activities designed to get it ready for sale.  In fact, 
Relational Investors often seeks two board seats on firms in which it invests because 
doing so always allows them to second their motions, thus forcing a board vote and 
making the issue a matter of record. This example illustrates how dedicated institutional 
investors can amplify their activism through specific board representatives, which I 
describe in the following paragraphs. 
 Dedicated institutional owners have historically sought to influence competitive 
action by influencing management, the board of directors, or both. Shortly after World 
War II the adoption of SEC rule 14a-8 forced managers to entertain shareholder 
proposals, giving dedicated institutional owners a somewhat more direct form of 
influence (Sundaramurthy & Lyon, 1998). However, until the mid-1980s most of these 
proposals were limited to very few “gadfly” individuals that were treated with 
condescension at annual meetings. Recent years, however, have seen rapidly escalating 
involvement from dedicated institutional investors, with increasing amounts and new 
forms of activism emerging every year (Gillan & Starks, 2007). As the role of dedicated 
institutional owners has gained momentum, these investors have sought ways to ensure 
that their voice is heard and not ignored. 
 One of the most commonly studied means that institutional owners use to make 
certain that competitive actions will comply with their investment preferences is a board 
of directors that represents them well. Agency theorists have traditionally examined the 
extent to which the board of directors represents the interests of shareholders by 
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measuring board independence (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Mizruchi, 1983). This 
research generally suggests that (a) outside directors will be more concerned with 
financial controls and immediate returns (Tihanyi et al., 2003) and (b) inside directors 
have better access to internal information and are therefore more apt to rely on strategic 
controls and pursue projects with long-term positive returns (Zahra, 1996). However, 
several meta-analyses and reviews have not found systematic relationships between board 
independence and corporate performance (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). Further, owing to increased 
emphasis on independence, board insiders are becoming somewhat of a dying breed 
(Raheja, 2005). This suggests that institutional owners seeking better representation on 
the board of directors need to look beyond simply distinguishing between insiders or 
outsiders who, in principal, represent their interests. 
 Dedicated institutional owners are increasingly addressing this issue by 
attempting to garner one or more board seats for their own specific representative. A seat 
on the board of directors provides added influence in at least three important ways 
(Johnson et al., 1996). First, it provides a high level of inside information about firm 
resources, projects, and strategic alternatives (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kesner, 1987). 
Access to this rich information allows directors to understand the long-term benefits of 
strategic competitive actions, making them likely to be in favor of such actions. Second, a 
board seat provides the ability to monitor board and management actions (Sundaramurthy 
& Lewis, 2003). They can use this improved monitoring to ensure that the company is 
investing in strategic competitive actions that will provide long-term shareholder value. 
Third, a board seat provides a mechanism to put forward proposals and votes at board 
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meetings. This gives added sway beyond proposals put forward at annual shareholder 
meetings. For these reasons, holding a seat on the board of directors increases the ability 
of dedicated institutional investors to influence firm strategic competitive activity. 
Garnering a board seat is a viable strategy for dedicated institutional investors 
because they are involved with the firm for long enough duration. Investors need quite a 
bit of time to benefit from a board seat because they first need to negotiate with the firm 
and possibly wage a campaign in order to capture the board seat. Also, the benefits are 
not immediate. For example, it will take time for the new board member to gain inside 
knowledge about the firm and to be in a position to recommend strategic competitive 
actions that will result in long-term value for shareholders. Dedicated institutional 
investors are invested with firms in their portfolio long enough capture a board seat and 
benefit from it. Therefore, dedicated institutional investors are likely to be interested in 
capturing a seat on the board of firms in which they invest. When they do so, it will 
facilitate their ability to ensure those firms are investing in strategic competitive actions. 
Interestingly, scholars have not yet considered how specific owner representatives on the 
board of directors affect firm level outcomes. 
H3: The positive relationship between dedicated institutional ownership and the 
firm’s level of strategic competitive activity is moderated by owner representation 
on the board of directors; the relationship is strengthened when representation is 
high. 
 
Common Ownership Between Rivals 
Another possible moderator of the relationship between dedicated institutional 
investors and strategic competitive activity arises from the notion of mutual forbearance. 
Researchers almost always consider mutual forbearance in the same breath as multi-
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market competition, with the idea being that firms competing simultaneously in several 
markets are more likely to stake out spheres of influence (Baum & Korn, 1996; Gimeno, 
1999; Gimeno & Woo, 1996a). They do so when Firm A intentionally refrains from 
competitive activity in a market where Firm B is dominant, with the implicit 
understanding that Firm B will reciprocate, refraining from competitive activity in a 
market where Firm A is dominant. However, we may also understand mutual forbearance 
in a more general sense as a live-and-let-live policy wherein firms implicitly agree to 
refrain from competitive activity in one or all markets in which they compete (Stephan et 
al., 2003). In this way, mutual forbearance is not about two firms staking out separate 
spheres of influence, but instead describes two firms tacitly colluding to achieve 
maximum profits within the same sphere of influence. 
Mutual forbearance in this latter sense lends itself to the commonly expressed 
prisoner’s dilemma. Simply stated, Firm A will achieve the highest profits when they 
undertake strategic competitive activity but Firm B does not. However, Firm B is likely 
to retaliate, which would provide the lowest profits to both firms. The highest aggregate 
profits are earned when both firms restrict strategic competitive activity, or mutually 
forbear. The dilemma arises because, should Firm A forbear in anticipation of mutual 
benefit, it will suffer if Firm B does not reciprocate. The only possible equilibrium is that 
each firm will continue to engage in strategic competitive activity, unless some 
mechanism exists to resolve the dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Bettis & Weeks, 1987). 
Interfirm mechanisms that can foster cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma include those 
that signal trust, deter rivalrous behavior, or govern both potential defectors in the rivalry 
(Caves & Porter, 1977; Perks & Halliday, 2003; Young et al., 2000). 
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Dedicated institutional owners will be interested in potential profit gains 
associated with mutual forbearance. However, dedicated institutional owners impose 
pressure on firms to engage in strategic competitive activity. There is little reason to 
believe that they would reduce this pressure on the hope that rivals would mutually 
forbear, as the prisoner’s dilemma suggests, because they have no guarantee that rival 
firms will cooperate. Any pressure they apply to refrain from strategic competitive 
activity would be one-sided and self-defeating.  
An exception occurs when dedicated institutional investors can leverage a 
mechanism to circumvent the prisoner’s dilemma. One such mechanism may occur when 
dedicated institutional investors have high levels of ownership of both firms in a rivalry. 
In this case, dedicated institutional investors serve as a mechanism fostering cooperation. 
This works in at least two ways. First, when dedicated institutional investors have high 
levels of ownership of rival firms it provides leakage that fosters collusion. Firms are in 
constant communication with their owners about strategic intentions, so if there is 
commonality among these owners then there is a greater likelihood that firms will know 
and understand the signals that they are trying to send to each other. Second, dedicated 
institutional investors with high levels of ownership in rival firms have the capacity to 
govern both firms. When a firm restricts its strategic competitive activity it can be more 
confident that its rival will cooperate because a common owner has the ability to punish 
defectors. Thus, an interfirm governance structure arises such that dedicated institutional 
investors may be less likely to apply pressure on either firm to engage in strategic 
competitive activity because they are aware that increased competition will reduce 
average profits in the industry. Therefore, although dedicated institutional investors are 
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generally interested in fostering strategic competitive activity, this relationship will be 
tempered when rival ownership is high. Cohen et al. (2003) describe this as a buffering 
interaction. 
H4: The positive relationship between dedicated institutional ownership and the 
firm’s level of strategic competitive activity is moderated by common dedicated 
institutional ownership of a firms’ rival. Specifically, high common dedicated 
institutional ownership weakens the relationship. 
 
Transient institutional owners are also likely to be interested in potential profit 
gains associated with mutual forbearance. Transient institutional investors with large 
stakes in rival firms can circumvent the prisoner’s dilemma in the same ways as 
dedicated institutional investors. Namely, they can leak information between rivals to 
improve signaling and they can punish defectors (through exit) for not cooperating with a 
rival’s forbearance (Axelrod, 1984; Caves & Porter, 1977). 
These owners already become cautious with increasing levels of strategic 
competitive activity, but rival ownership provides motivation for them to go a step further 
and actually discourage strategic competitive activity. Ownership of firm rivals provides 
transient owners with incentive to pressure firms to limit strategic competitive actions. 
When ownership of rivals is low, transient institutional investors follow the earlier 
pattern of encouraging strategic competitive activity but at a decreasing rate, applying 
pressure with the threat of exit. When rival ownership is high, transient institutional 
investors have reason to pressure firms to avoid strategic competitive activity, because 
they can benefit from mutual forbearance. Thus, the earlier pattern of a decreasing 
positive relationship between transient owners and strategic competitive activity is 
dampened in the presence of rival ownership, and may even reach an inflection point 
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when there are a large number of transient institutional investors with stakes in rival 
firms. That is, when rival ownership is high transient institutional investors may reach a 
point where they discourage strategic competitive activity.  
Rival ownership changes the nature of the principal-agent relationship. When 
rival ownership is low, transient institutional investors become decreasingly tolerant of 
strategic competitive activity and use the threat of exit to impose their desires to limit the 
increased use of strategic competitive actions. That is, they monitor to ensure that the 
agent is acting in the principal’s best interest. However, when rival ownership is high, 
transient institutional investors can influence both firms to reduce competitive activity 
because it is not only in the owners’ interest but also provides higher profits for each firm 
in the rivalry. Thus, when transient institutional investors own large percentages of both 
firms in a rivalry principal and agent interests are aligned, and they are in a position to 
convince firms to restrict strategic competitive activity for their own best interests.  
The above arguments again suggest a curvilinear relationship between transient 
institutional investors and strategic competitive activity, but also suggest a possible 
inflection point where the relationship becomes negative. This yields an inverted-U 
shaped relationship. 
H5: The curvilinear relationship between transient institutional ownership and 
the firm’s level of strategic competitive activity is moderated by common transient 
institutional ownership of a firms’ rival; the relationship becomes an inverted-U 
when common transient institutional ownership is high. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Sample 
The sample is a longitudinal data set of large U.S. firms. It consists of all dual-
firm competitive rivalries in the Fortune 500 during the years 1997-2006, inclusive. In 
competitive dynamics research, dyadic rivalries exhibit a number of unique properties 
that make them a particularly interesting and useful subset of competitive relationships 
between firms (Cool et al., 1999; Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Porac et al., 
1995). First, competitive actions taken by a firm in a dyadic rivalry have a direct effect on 
the market share of the rival firm (Ferrier & Lee, 2002). So, dyadic rivalries naturally 
isolate competitive actions so that scholars may study them without the noise of a larger 
group of competitors and competitive activity (Ferrier et al., 1999). Second, the actors in 
dyadic rivalries are well defined, making it possible to study how specific characteristics 
of the actors affect competitive dynamics (Golden & Ma, 2003). Third, dyadic 
competitive rivalries allow scholars to consider the development of competitive dynamics 
over time because the actors generally do not change. Lastly, dyadic competitive rivalries 
may also exhibit unique properties, such as inter-organizational governance mechanisms, 
that influence the way firms compete. Two firms competing head-to-head, each with 
appreciable market share, is a common phenomenon in the marketplace (Yoffie & 
Cusumano, 1999), making the study of competitive rivalry an important scholarly 
concern. 
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Following prior research on market leaders and challengers, firms need to be 
ranked No. 1 and No. 2 in their industry in terms of sales and have Rumelt’s 
specialization ratios greater than .70 to be included for analysis (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier & 
Lee, 2002). This yields a set of single- and dominant-business firms that are acutely 
aware of each other’s strategic competitive activity. Further, to analyze only dyadic 
rivalries, there is an additional restriction that both the No. 1 and No. 2 firms in the 
rivalry must hold at least a 15% share of the total market. This eliminates industries such 
as SIC code 4911 (electric utilities), where a dozen firms own somewhere between 1-3% 
of the market, so there is no obvious dyadic rivalry. Firms also need to be public because 
the hypotheses examine the influence of ownership structures. These restrictions yield a 
data set of 72 firms (i.e., 36 rivalries), as shown in Table 1. The sample is representative 
of a broad variety of industries. These firms accounted for an average of 66 percent of 
sales in their respective industries.  
Compiling the data required three main types of data collection: that associated 
with boards, owners, and competitive dynamics. Board data were primarily available 
from the IRRC database. This database provided names and affiliations of the board 
members for all firms in the sampling window. Some years, however, were either missing 
or incomplete in the IRRC database, so I filled in missing data by gathering the 
information directly from the firm’s DEF 14-A filing. CEO compensation data was 
available from Compustat’s Execucomp database. This, too, was not complete, requiring 
missing CEO compensation data to also be collected from DEF 14-A filings. The archival 
sources had complete information for approximately 85% of the firm-years, with 15% 
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being collected from proxy statements. Control variables, including firm financial data, 
size, and industry context variables were compiled from Compustat. 
 
TABLE 1  
Fortune 500 Dyadic Competitive Rivalries, 1997-2006 
 
SIC INDUSTRY NAME FIRM A FIRM B 
1. ACCIDENT & HEALTH INS UNUM AFLAC 
2. ADVERTISING AGENCIES OMNICOM INTERPUBLIC 
3. AGRICULTURE – CROPS DOLE FOOD CHIQUITA BRANDS 
4. AUTO SUPPLY STORES AUTOZONE ADVANCE AUTO PARTS 
5. BAKERY PRODUCTS FLOWERS FOODS INTERSTATE BAKERIES 
6. BOOK STORES-RETL BORDERS BARNES & NOBLE  
7. CARPETS AND RUGS SHAW INDUSTRIES MOHAWK INDUSTRIES  
8. CMP PROCESS,DATA PREP FIRST DATA AUTO. DATA PROCESSING 
9. COMPUTERS & S/W-WHSL TECH DATA INGRAM MICRO  
10. DPMT STORES J.C. PENNEY FEDERATED 
11. DRUGS - WHSL MCKESSON CARDINAL HEALTH  
12. ELECTRONIC PARTS-WHSL AVNET ARROW ELECTRONICS  
13. GAS & OTHER SERV UGI SEMPRA ENERGY 
14. GEN MED & SURG HOSP HCA TENET HEALTHCARE 
15. GRAIN MILL PRODUCTS KELLOGG GENERAL MILLS  
16. HOSPITAL & MED SVC PLANS CIGNA AETNA  
17. INDL INORGANIC CHEM PRAXAIR AIR PRODUCTS 
18. LUMBER & BLDG-RETL LOWE'S HOME DEPOT  
19. MED, DNTL, HOSP EQ-WHSL SCHEIN HENRY OWENS & MINOR  
20. METAL CANS BALL CORP CROWN HOLDINGS 
21. METALWORKING MACH BLACK & DECKER ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS 
22. MISC AMUSEMENT & REC MGM MIRAGE HARRAHS 
23. OFFICE SUPPLY – RTL STAPLES OFFICE DEPOT  
24. PERFUME & COSMETIC AVON COLGATE-PALMOLIVE 
25. PRIM SMELT ASARCO PHELPS DODGE 
26. PROF & COML EQ-WHSL FISHER SCIENTIFIC IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS 
27. PUBLIC BLDG & FURN LEAR JOHNSON CONTROLS  
28. CONS ELECTR STORES CIRCUIT CITY BEST BUY  
29. RAILROADS,LINE-HAUL BNSF UNION PACIFIC 
30. REFUSE SYSTEMS ALLIED WASTE WASTE MANAGEMENT 
31. RUBBER & PLASTIC FOOTWR REEBOK NIKE   
32. SKILLED NURSING CARE FAC KINDRED HEALTHCARE BEVERLY ENTERPRISES  
33. REFIN NONFER METAL OM GROUP ALERIS 
34. SPCL CLEAN,POLISH PREPS ECOLAB CLOROX 
35. SURGICAL,MED APPARATUS BECTON DICKINSON BAXTER INTERNATIONAL  
36. TITLE INSURANCE FIRST AMERICAN FIDELITY NATIONAL 
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Ownership data were available from the CDA/Spectrum database. This database 
compiles information from SEC forms 13-F, which is a quarterly listing of major stock 
holders. The database allows this information to be reverse-compiled in order to collect 
data about all firms owned by a particular investor. This provides the raw information 
necessary to code investors as dedicated, transient, or quasi-indexer, in accordance with 
Bushee’s (1998) categorizations. One of the problems with ownership data is that 
archival databases do not identify investors at the level of the individual fund, but rather 
at the level of the fund family. Bushee’s (1998) categorizations partially obviate this 
problem because they describe investors in terms of their trading history.  
Bushee (2001) classifies investors based on their investment time horizon using a 
combined factor analysis and cluster analysis. First, three factors describe each 
institutional investor. These are (1) the level of portfolio diversification, (2) portfolio 
turnover, and (3) the investor’s trading sensitivity. Portfolio diversification is a composite 
measure of the average percentage of the institution’s holdings invested in each firm, the 
average size of the institution’s ownership position in its portfolio of firms, the 
percentage of holdings invested in firms greater than 5 percent, and a Herfindahl 
concentration index. Portfolio turnover is also a composite of the annual change in 
ownership positions and the percentage of firms that the investor has held continuously 
for at least two years. Lastly, trading sensitivity combines a ratio of changes in ownership 
position to firm’s earning announcements with the average earnings change in firms 
bought minus firms sold.  
 These variables are then entered into a k-means cluster analysis on the factors to 
obtain a final separation into groups. Transient institutions have high portfolio turnover 
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and more diversified portfolios. Dedicated institutions have low turnover and 
concentrated holdings. For the sample of this dissertation, there were a total of 1,302 one-
percent institutional investors. 100 of these were at some point during the sampling 
window classified as dedicated institutional investors and 383 were classified as transient. 
The mean number of dedicated institutional investors per firm is 1.9, and they hold an 
average of 11.9% of the firm’s total shares. The mean number of transient institutional 
investors per firm is 4.6, and they hold an average of 10.1% of the firm. 
Lastly, I collected competitive dynamics data through a Lexis-Nexis search, 
coding news articles similar to prior competitive dynamics research (Derfus et al., 2008; 
Ferrier & Lee, 2002). Competitive actions are considered to be any newsworthy move 
initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive position. Most definitions of what this 
includes parallel that of Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm as “all externally directed, specific, 
and observable newly created moves initiated by a firm to enhance its competitive 
position” (1999: 378). Actions that are observable to outsiders are most likely to be 
reported in the business press, so the Lexis-Nexis search was focused on business news 
publications (Derfus et al., 2008). This includes major business newspapers (e.g., 
Investor’s Business Daily and The Wall Street Journal), aggregate news sources (e.g., 
Marketwatch and Global News Wire), business newsmagazines (e.g., Business Week and 
Advertising Age), and newswires (e.g., Associated Press and Thomson Financial News). 
It also includes more regional versions of these same source types (e.g., Xinhua 
Economic News Service and The Business Times of Singapore).  
A headline is considered to report a strategic competitive action when the action 
has three components. First, it must involve significant commitment of specific assets 
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(Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986), most typically a financial investment or some other 
commitment of fixed assets. Second, the action must be difficult to implement (Hambrick 
et. al, 1996). Actions that are difficult to implement are more strategic because they are 
more difficult for rivals to imitate. One way that an action may be difficult to implement 
may be that it takes time. Strategic competitive actions almost universally have longer 
time horizons than tactical actions (Miller & Chen, 1996; Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). 
Third, for an action to be strategic it must be difficult to reverse (Hambrick et al., 1996; 
Smith et al., 1992). Chen and Macmillan (1992) describe how the extent to which an 
action is irreversible contributes to its interpretation as a strategic commitment. 
As an example of what constituted a strategic action, alliances were considered 
strategic only when they involved a commitment of assets to offer a new product or 
service. Another example, opening or closing a distribution center, was typically 
considered strategic because it disrupted established delivery mechanisms, but opening or 
closing a store was not strategic because that was more commonplace and easier to 
implement. Offering a new product or service was not strategic unless it was 
fundamentally different from the firm’s existing product and service offerings. In general, 
actions fell into one of several broad categories: product, service, subsidiary 
establishment/divestment, acquisition, alliance, supply chain/distribution/capacity, 
organizational restructuring, and technological investment. The most common actions 
were acquisitions and the least common were major technology investments. 
Headline searches for the 72 firms in this sample yielded 48,354 Lexis-Nexis 
headlines during the years 1997-2006. I read the “expanded list” version of each of these 
headlines, which includes both the headline and some additional information such as the 
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source, author, date, and the first few lines of the story. Reading the headlines of each 
firm in chronological order allowed me to go deep into the life of the firm and make more 
accurate decisions about strategic actions than would be provided by structured content 
analysis. Based on the headlines, I identified 1,254 articles that described unique strategic 
competitive actions. Only the earliest report of an action was recorded. On average, firms 
undertook 17.4 strategic actions over the course of the ten year sampling window. As a 
check, an independent coder read all of the headlines for a random sample of 10% of the 
firms in the data set (i.e., eight firms), selecting out those headlines that reported strategic 
competitive actions. Agreement between coders for this random subsample using the 
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) (Schrout & Fleiss, 1979) was 94.7%. The raters 
discussed and came to agreement on all cases where they coded actions differently, 
finding that such cases primarily emerged when the headline and article were not clear 
about the magnitude of the firm’s investment necessary to implement the action. 
Measures 
 Dependent Variable. This is a composite measure designed to capture the extent 
of strategic competitive activity by considering both the number of actions and the 
significance of those actions. Prior research in competitive dynamics has measured total 
competitive activity, operationalized as the number of competitive actions initiated by a 
firm in a given period of time (Derfus et al., 2008; Ferrier et al., 1999). Therefore, the 
first dependent variable is a count variable of the number of strategic competitive actions 
initiated for every firm in every year of the data set.  
However, all strategic competitive actions do not have equal significance. Given a 
firm’s number of competitive actions, it is helpful to provide added variance by 
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combining this information with the significance of each action. Therefore, each action 
was coded for its irreversibility to indicate the ability of the firm to change course after 
implementing the action. An action may be irreversible if overturning the action would 
involve significant commitment of resources, disruption of staff or processes, 
negotiations with unions or external parties, negative publicity, or institutional 
bureaucracy (Chen & Macmillan, 1992). Two individuals independently coded each of 
the strategic competitive actions, rating them on a five point scale of irreversibility (1 = 
very low, 5 = very high). Agreement between raters using the ICC (Shrout & Fleiss, 
1979) was 79.7%. The raters then discussed all actions where they coded irreversibility 
with more than one point difference to come to mutual agreement on a score, resulting in 
a final agreement between raters of 83.3%. This allowed for creation of a composite score 
of strategic competitive activity, where each action is multiplied by its irreversibility and 
the results are summed annually by firm. For strategic competitive actions where the 
irreversibility scores of the two coders disagreed by a single point, the lower score 
prevailed. 
 Independent Variables. Most of the independent variables revolve around 
institutional ownership. This includes all institutional owners with at least 1 percent 
equity, which removes owners with marginal equity positions (Johnson & Greening, 
1999; Tihanyi et al., 2003). The level of dedicated (transient) institutional ownership is 
operationalized as the percentage of outstanding shares of each firm that are owned by 
investors categorized as dedicated (transient). Hypotheses 4 and 5 address common 
institutional ownership of the rival firm. Common dedicated (transient) institutional 
ownership of rival is operationalized as the percentage of the rival firm’s total shares that 
51 
 
are owned by dedicated (transient) institutional investors who also own at least 1 percent 
of the focal firm.  
Scholars have not yet operationalized board representation of dedicated 
institutional owners. I measured this as a count variable, increasing by one for each 
director that specifically represents a dedicated institutional investor. A director 
specifically represents a dedicated institutional investor when they have been elected to 
the board at the request of one particular investor. I gathered this information from firm 
proxy statements and Lexis-Nexis. 
 Control Variables. Prior research indicates that a range of variables beyond those 
described in the hypotheses may affect competitive activity. Therefore, a number of 
control variables are included in the analysis. Some firm characteristics may influence 
competitive activity. For example, large firms may have greater resources and therefore 
be more likely to engage in competitive activity, so firm size controls for this with the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees. More important, however, is the 
ability of the firm to undertake strategic competitive activity. Therefore, financial slack 
controls for ability with a measure of unabsorbed slack using the quick ratio. This is a 
ratio of current assets less inventory to current liabilities (Ferrier, 2001). Similarly, 
strategic competitive activity may be a function of how well, or poorly, a firm is 
performing. Past performance is therefore included as a control using a measure of each 
firm’s lagged return on sales (ROS) (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
Industry level variables may also have a confounding influence on the dependent 
variable. Firms may be more likely to engage in strategic competitive activity in 
industries that are growing because such industries provide a greater chance of success. I 
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control for industry growth with the rate of the percentage change in industry gross sales 
between the focal and the previous period for each four-digit SIC category. Industry 
concentration is so closely connected with strategic competitive activity that it is 
sometimes used as a proxy to control for the competitiveness of an industry. An inverse-
Herfindahl index controls for industry concentration for each four-digit SIC category of 
the panel data set (Marquis, 2003). 
The generalized motivation for this study is to consider the influence of 
governance on competitive dynamics between firms. Therefore, it is important to control 
for other governance mechanisms that could confound examination of the effects of 
institutional ownership. One important form of governance that affects firm strategies is 
that of executive compensation (Devers et al., 2007). CEO compensation is included as a 
control, measured as the total value of salary, bonus, and the granted value of stock 
options. CEOs that also serve as board chairs help establish strong leadership but also 
may promote entrenchment (Daily & Dalton, 1994). The effect of CEO duality on firm 
strategies is complex, so it is also included as a dummy control variable (Boyd, 1995). 
Table 2 summarizes the variables described above. 
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TABLE 2  
Summary of Variables 
 
Variable Type Operationalization 
Dependent   
Number of strategic 
competitive actions 
count Count of strategic competitive actions. 
Strategic competitive 
activity 
weighted count Count of strategic competitive actions, with each 
action multiplied by a score from 1 to 5 to indicate 
its irreversibility. 
   
Independent   
Dedicated institutional 
ownership 
continuous Percentage of outstanding shares owned by investors 
categorized as dedicated. 
Transient institutional 
ownership 
continuous Percentage of outstanding shares owned by investors 
categorized as transient. 
   
Moderators   
Board representation count Count variable of the number of directors that 
represent a specific dedicated institutional investor. 
Common dedicated 
institutional ownership  
of rival 
continuous Percentage of the rival firm’s total shares that are 
owned by dedicated institutional investors who also 
own at least 1% of the focal firm. 
Common transient 
institutional ownership 
of rival 
continuous Percentage of the rival firm’s total shares that are 
owned by transient institutional investors who also 
own at least 1% of the focal firm. 
   
Controls   
Firm size continuous ln(number of employees) 
Financial slack continuous Quick ratio 
Past performance continuous ln(return on sales), lagged 
Industry growth continuous Percentage change in industry gross sales for each 
four-digit SIC 
Industry concentration continuous Inverse-Herfindahl index for each four-digit SIC 
CEO compensation continuous Combined salary, bonus, and options in millions 
CEO duality dummy 1 if CEO is also the board chair 
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Analysis 
 Table 3 reports the inter-correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of all 
variables in this study. All correlations are shown for centered predictor variables, but the 
means and standard deviations are reported uncentered to facilitate interpretation. The 
mean number of strategic actions undertaken by firms in the data set is 1.8 per year. 
When these actions were weighted for irreversibility, the mean was 4.9, so the average 
irreversibility score for strategic actions was 2.7. Home Depot took largest number of 
strategic actions in the data set in 2006 when they acquired new operations in China, 
revamped store designs, and expanded their commitment to new product and service 
offerings such as consumer financing and contractor supply. Most firms had at least one 
year in the sampling window during which they initiated zero strategic competitive 
actions. 
 On average, firms had positive performance of 4% as measured by return on 
sales, and experienced positive return on sales an average of 9 out of the 10 years in the 
sampling window. Overall, industries in which these firms compete grew at a rate of 14% 
per year. The highest performing firms were in the computer data processing industry 
(SIC 7374) and the lowest performing firms were in metalworking and refining (SICs 
3330 and 3540). A mean quick ratio of 1.3 for all firms indicated a relatively small 
amount of average financial slack. CEOs in this sample netted an average of $7.7 million 
per year, including stock options, and more often than not also served as Chairman of the 
Board. 
Correlations between variables suggested no problems of multicollinearity. The 
highest correlations came about with inclusion of the quadratic term and with interactions 
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that included the quadratic, because these variables were derived from measured 
variables. However, all correlations not including the quadratic were below .50. As 
should be expected, correlations between firm size and the year dummy variables 
increase as the year increases, showing that the firms are getting bigger over time. The 
same is true of CEO compensation, showing that CEOs are steadily earning more money 
each year. The level of dedicated and transient institutional ownership also showed some 
correlation with specific years, but there was no obvious trend in the direction as either 
increasing or decreasing over time. 
The dependent variable, number of strategic competitive actions, is described by a 
non-negative integer count variable. Applying linear regression to count outcomes can 
result in inconsistent and biased estimates because the underlying distribution violates the 
normality assumption (Long & Freese, 2006). Poisson-distributed variables can approach 
normality when the mean is very high (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003), but the 
mean annual number of strategic competitive actions undertaken by a firm was small 
(Chen et al., 1992), so normality is not a safe assumption to make of the dependent 
variable. A better approach is to use a Poisson or negative binomial regression model. 
The use of such models for count outcomes, including those derived from panel data, is 
common in strategic management literature (e.g., Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Penner-Hahn & 
Shaver, 2005). A likelihood ratio test of overdispersion indicated the dependent variable 
is more closely aligned with the negative binomial distribution rather than the Poisson 
distribution. The more detailed dependent variable, strategic competitive activity, is a 
weighted count of the number of strategic competitive actions. Weighted counts follow 
distributions similar to count variables (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005; Lerner, 2005), and 
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this dependent variable is also overdispersed, suggesting negative binomial regression is 
the most appropriate technique. 
I observe each firm ten times, pooling observations across years. Pooling repeated 
observations may violate negative binomial regression’s assumption of independence. 
This could yield autocorrelation of the model’s residuals and incorrect variance estimates. 
Therefore, following Certo and Semadeni (2006), all models include time dummy 
variables coded for each year in the analysis. Further, using random effects negative 
binomial models ensures that error due to serial correlation in the panel data set is also 
specified and analyzed (Greve, 2003). All independent variables are centered before 
being added into the models to reduce potential for multicollinearity. 
Table 4 reports the results for random effects negative binomial regression using 
the initial dependent variable: number of strategic competitive actions. The first model 
shows the influence of the selected control variables. As expected, a firm’s past 
performance is an important predictor of its strategic competitive actions. Firm size is 
also a statistically significant predictor, with large firms being more likely to implement 
strategic competitive actions. Similarly, CEO compensation predicts the number of 
strategic competitive actions, with higher paid CEOs implementing a greater number of 
actions. Other control variables were not statistically significant, and have also not 
yielded systematic results in prior competitive dynamics studies (Derfus et al., 2008; 
Ferrier, 2001).  For example, consistent with Lee, Smith, Grimm, and Schoenberg (2000), 
I find that industry concentration is not correlated with, nor is a good predictor of, the 
number of competitive actions. 
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TABLE 4  
Results of random-effects negative binomial regression with action count as DV 
 
N = 682 Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial slack .07 
(.07) 
.06 
(.07) 
.07 
(.07) 
.07 
(.07) 
.07 
(.07) 
.08 
(.07) 
.08 
(.07) 
.08 
(.07) 
Firm performance 3.61 *** 
(1.02) 
3.90 *** 
(1.02) 
3.48 *** 
(1.00) 
3.48 *** 
(1.00) 
3.48 *** 
(1.00) 
3.53 *** 
(1.00) 
3.46 *** 
(1.00) 
3.44 *** 
(1.00) 
Firm size .24 *** 
(.06) 
.22 *** 
(.06) 
.21 *** 
(.05) 
.21 *** 
(.05) 
.20 *** 
(.05) 
.21 *** 
(.05) 
.20 *** 
(.05) 
.20 *** 
(.05) 
CEO compensation .82 ** 
(.27) 
.90 ** 
(.27) 
1.08 *** 
(.27) 
1.11 *** 
(.28) 
1.19 *** 
(.28) 
.89 ** 
(.31) 
.91 ** 
(.31) 
.91 ** 
(.31) 
CEO duality .06 
(.09) 
.04 
(.08) 
.04 
(.08) 
.04 
(.08) 
.03 
(.09) 
.04 
(.09) 
.04 
(.08) 
.04 
(.08) 
Industry growth  -.03 
(.17) 
-.02 
(.17) 
-.02 
(.16) 
-.03 
(.17) 
-.07 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.17) 
-.04 
(.17) 
Industry concentration -.03 
(.37) 
.03 
(.37) 
.04 
(.36) 
.03 
(.36) 
.04 
(.36) 
-.01 
(.36) 
-.03 
(.36) 
-.04 
(.36) 
         
Dedicated ownership  1.46 *** 
(.44) 
1.35 *** 
(.44) 
1.37 *** 
(.44) 
1.39 *** 
(.44) 
1.33 *** 
(.43) 
1.37 *** 
(.43) 
1.37 *** 
(.43) 
         
Transient ownership   -1.74*** 
(.55) 
-1.94*** 
(.65) 
-1.93*** 
(.65) 
-2.07*** 
(.65) 
-2.07*** 
(.64) 
-2.08*** 
(.65) 
         
Transient ownershp squared    2.50 
(4.05) 
2.78 
(4.04) 
2.81 
(4.02) 
3.23 
(4.04) 
5.57 
(4.46) 
         
Rival dedicated ownership     -1.28 
(.73) 
-.95 
(.73) 
-.95 
(.73) 
-1.02 
(.73) 
         
Dedicated ownership x 
  rival dedicated ownership 
     -13.27* 
(5.80) 
-13.05* 
(5.79) 
-13.65** 
(5.81) 
         
Rival transient ownership       -.88 
(.88) 
-.26 
(1.04) 
         
Transient ownership x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -4.04 
(10.22) 
Transient ownership squared x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -33.98 
(61.22) 
         
Time dummy variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         
-2 log likelihood 2338 2326 2316 2316 2314 2308 2306 2306 
Wald Chi-Sq 92.8 104.9 117.0 117.5 120.5 129.6 131.4 132.8 
degrees of freedom 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that a firm’s level of ownership by dedicated shareholders is 
positively associated with the number of their strategic competitive actions. Model 2 
reports the regression results that examine this relationship. As shown in the table, the 
coefficient for dedicated institutional ownership is 1.46, which is statistically significant 
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(p < .001). Therefore, there is a positive association between the level of dedicated 
institutional ownership and the number of strategic competitive actions initiated by firms 
in this sample. H1 is supported. The Wald chi-square of this model improves to 104.9 (17 
d.f.) from an earlier value of 92.8 (16 d.f.) when only the control variables were 
incorporated. This is a statistically significant improvement, suggesting a better overall 
model fit when we include the level of dedicated institutional ownership. 
 Hypothesis 2 considered the relationship of transient shareholders on the same 
dependent variable, positing a curvilinear relationship. As shown in Models 3 and 4, the 
predicted shape of the relationship can be tested in negative binomial regression by first 
testing the main effect of transient shareholders and then adding the squared term into the 
model to examine nonlinear effects (Tuschke & Sanders, 2003). Model 3 tests the main 
effect alone, revealing a negative association between the level of transient ownership 
and a firm’s strategic competitive actions (p < .001). Although not hypothesized, this is a 
statistically significant result in itself, and addition of transient institutional ownership 
into the model increases overall model fit to a Wald chi-square of 117.0 (18 d.f.). 
However, adding the squared term in Model 4 did not change the main effect and had no 
effect on the model fit. This suggests the relationship between transient institutional 
ownership and strategic competitive activity does not have a curvilinear component, so 
H2 is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 3 stated the relationship between dedicated institutional ownership 
and the number of strategic competitive actions would be strengthened when those 
owners had representation on the board of directors. However, only three firms in the 
data set had a person that was placed on the board specifically at the behest of a dedicated 
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institutional investor, and these occurred late in the sampling window. These three were 
Kirk Kerkorian, Ralph Whitworth, and Carl Icahn, all of whom had representatives on 
firms in the data set. From a qualitative perspective, there may be some support for the 
notion that having board representation allowed these investors to more strongly voice 
their opinions about strategic competitive activity at firms included in this data set. For 
example, Whitworth’s Relational Investors appeared to have a strong influence on the 
many strategic competitive actions undertaken by Home Depot. Kerkorian’s Tracinda 
Investment Group virtually transformed MGM Mirage into the largest gambling 
operation in Las Vegas with several multi-billion dollar projects and acquisitions. 
However, despite this anecdotal evidence, three data points were not enough to examine 
the influence of dedicated institutional investors having board representation. There was, 
therefore, insufficient variance to test hypothesis 3. 
 The final two hypotheses tested interaction effects. H4 suggested the relationship 
between dedicated institutional owners and the number of strategic competitive actions 
would be dampened by common dedicated ownership of the firm’s rival. This interaction 
was tested in Models 5 and 6 and is depicted in Figure 1. The direct effect was added first 
and was not statistically significant. However, adding the interaction term in Model 6 
showed that dedicated institutional ownership of a firm’s rival changes the relationship 
between dedicated institutional investors and strategic competitive actions. Stated 
differently, when dedicated institutional ownership of the focal firm and its rival increase 
together, strategic competitive activity is lessened. Hypothesis 4, therefore, is supported. 
The sign and significance of the direct effects did not change as a result of including the 
interaction term. The overall model fit improves to a Wald chi-square of 129.6 (21 d.f.). 
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FIGURE 1  
Interaction between Dedicated Ownership of the Focal Firm and its Rival 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 suggested the relationship between transient institutional owners 
and the number of strategic competitive actions would also be dampened by common 
transient ownership of the firm’s rival. In this case, H5 posited that the interaction would 
bring about an inverted-U shaped relationship with the dependent variable. Wu, Levitas, 
and Priem (2005) examine a methodologically similar hypothesis, testing the direct and 
curvilinear effects first, followed by interactions with both the simple and quadratic terms 
in a moderating model. The direct effect of the moderating variable, transient institutional 
ownership of the rival firm, is tested in Model 7 and shown to be not statistically 
significant. Thus, higher transient institutional ownership of a rival firm does not directly 
influence strategic competitive activity of the focal firm. The interaction effects are then 
entered in Model 8 (Wu et al., 2005) and again are not statistically significant and do not 
improve model fit. Transient ownership of the rival firm, therefore, did not have the same 
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dampening effect on the relationship between transient institutional ownership and 
strategic competitive activity. Hypothesis 5 did not receive support. 
 A weighted count of strategic actions served as an alternative dependent variable. 
The results, again using random effects negative binomial regression, are shown in Table 
5.  There are no appreciable differences using this more specific dependent variable, 
except that it picks up the influence of financial slack. This seems to indicate that as firms 
gain additional financial slack they do not necessarily take more strategic actions, but the 
actions they do take are less reversible. We also gain a better overall model fit for this 
DV, with a final Wald Chi-Square of 164 as compared to 133 for the unweighted DV. 
Support for the hypotheses remains the same, supporting hypotheses 1 and 4 but not 
supporting hypotheses 2 and 5. 
 The random effects models reported in tables 4 and 5 are more efficient than their 
fixed effects counterparts because they use information about variation within firms and 
variation between firms. However, some have advocated that fixed effects models may be 
preferred because they effectively control for all possible firm characteristics that do not 
change over time (Allison, 2005). A Hausman test revealed that the Hausman statistic 
was not statistically significant, suggesting that differences in the coefficients provided 
by random and fixed effects models are not systematic. Therefore, random effects models 
are preferred because they conserve degrees of freedom. However, results of the fixed 
effects models are reported in Table 6, where it is seen that significance levels of the 
coefficients are not substantively different from random effects models, but the overall 
model fit is lessened. 
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TABLE 5  
Results of Random-Effects Negative Binomial Regression with Weighted Action Count as DV 
 
N = 682 Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial slack .13 * 
(.06) 
.11 * 
(.06) 
.13 * 
(.06) 
.13 * 
(.06) 
.12 * 
(.06) 
.14 * 
(.06) 
.14 * 
(.06) 
.14 * 
(.06) 
Firm performance 4.11 *** 
(.92) 
4.35 *** 
(.92) 
3.92 *** 
(.92) 
3.90 *** 
(.92) 
3.94 *** 
(.92) 
3.98 *** 
(.92) 
3.91 *** 
(.92) 
3.91 *** 
(.92) 
Firm size .23 *** 
(.05) 
.21 *** 
(.05) 
.20 *** 
(.05) 
.20 *** 
(.05) 
.19 *** 
(.05) 
.20 *** 
(.05) 
.19 *** 
(.05) 
.19 *** 
(.05) 
CEO compensation .89 *** 
(.28) 
1.01 *** 
(.28) 
1.13 *** 
(.28) 
1.17 *** 
(.28) 
1.24 *** 
(.28) 
1.25 *** 
(.28) 
.94 *** 
(.31) 
.94 *** 
(.31) 
CEO duality .15 
(.09) 
.14 
(.09) 
.12 
(.09) 
.12 
(.09) 
.12 
(.09) 
.13 
(.09) 
.13 
(.09) 
.13 
(.09) 
Industry growth  -.01 
(.18) 
.01 
(.18) 
.01 
(.18) 
.01 
(.18) 
-.02 
(.18) 
.01 
(.18) 
.01 
(.18) 
.01 
(.18) 
Industry concentration .05 
(.33) 
.05 
(.32) 
.04 
(.32) 
.03 
(.32) 
.05 
(.32) 
-.02 
(.32) 
-.07 
(.32) 
-.08 
(.32) 
         
Dedicated ownership  1.38 *** 
(.42) 
1.35 *** 
(.42) 
1.37 *** 
(.42) 
1.41 *** 
(.42) 
1.34 *** 
(.42) 
1.42 *** 
(.41) 
1.43 *** 
(.41) 
         
Transient ownership   -1.42 ** 
(.56) 
-1.68 ** 
(.66) 
-1.63 ** 
(.66) 
-1.76 ** 
(.66) 
-1.74 ** 
(.66) 
-1.77 ** 
(.66) 
         
Transient ownershp squared    3.02 
(4.09) 
3.20 
(4.09) 
3.21 
(4.06) 
3.84 
(4.06) 
7.29 
(4.47) 
         
Rival dedicated ownership     -1.16 
(.74) 
-.68 
(.75) 
-.61 
(.75) 
-.69 
(.75) 
         
Dedicated ownership x 
  rival dedicated ownership 
     -13.20* 
(5.82) 
-12.99* 
(5.81) 
-13.61** 
(5.80) 
         
Rival transient ownership       -1.37 
(.93) 
-.27 
(1.09) 
         
Transient ownership x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -4.84 
(10.76) 
Transient ownership squared x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -58.21 
(64.26) 
         
Time dummy variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         
-2 log likelihood 3528 3516 3510 3510 3510 3502 3500 3496 
Wald Chi-Sq 123.2 136.7 145.0 145.2 146.1 158.5 162.1 164.0 
degrees of freedom 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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TABLE 6  
Results of Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression with Weighted Action Count as DV 
 
N = 682 Model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Financial slack .09 
(.09) 
.09 
(.09) 
.08 
(.09) 
.08 
(.09) 
.08 
(.09) 
.10 
(.09) 
.11 
(.09) 
.11 
(.09) 
Firm performance 4.31 *** 
(1.24) 
4.59 *** 
(1.27) 
4.40 *** 
(1.26) 
4.38 *** 
(1.26) 
4.41 *** 
(1.26) 
4.52 *** 
(1.26) 
4.44 *** 
(1.27) 
4.37 *** 
(1.27) 
Firm size .35 *** 
(.08) 
.33 *** 
(.08) 
.32 *** 
(.08) 
.32 *** 
(.08) 
.32 *** 
(.08) 
.34 *** 
(.08) 
.34 *** 
(.08) 
.34 *** 
(.08) 
CEO compensation .65 * 
(.33) 
.74 * 
(.33) 
.88 ** 
(.34) 
.96 ** 
(.34) 
1.04 *** 
(.34) 
.71 * 
(.37) 
.72 * 
(.37) 
.72 * 
(.37) 
CEO duality .14 
(.10) 
.12 
(.10) 
.12 
(.10) 
.12 
(.10) 
.11 
(.10) 
.12 
(.10) 
.12 
(.10) 
.13 
(.10) 
Industry growth  -.08 
(.19) 
-.06 
(.19) 
-.06 
(.19) 
-.08 
(.19) 
-.12 
(.19) 
-.09 
(.19) 
-.10 
(.19) 
-.11 
(.19) 
Industry concentration .11 
(.50) 
.09 
(.50) 
.15 
(.50) 
.14 
(.50) 
.14 
(.50) 
.07 
(.51) 
.01 
(.51) 
-.02 
(.51) 
         
Dedicated ownership  1.19 * 
(.50) 
1.10 * 
(.50) 
1.13 * 
(.50) 
1.15 * 
(.50) 
1.13 * 
(.49) 
1.17 * 
(.49) 
1.17 * 
(.49) 
         
Transient ownership   -1.27 * 
(.61) 
-1.71 * 
(.74) 
-1.69 * 
(.74) 
-1.82 * 
(.74) 
-1.83 * 
(.74) 
-1.84 * 
(.74) 
         
Transient ownershp squared    4.55 
(4.31) 
4.81 
(4.30) 
4.82 
(4.29) 
5.52 
(4.34) 
8.96 
(4.75) 
         
Rival dedicated ownership     -1.18 
(.84) 
-.79 
(.84) 
-.83 
(.84) 
-.93 
(.84) 
         
Dedicated ownership x 
  rival dedicated ownership 
     -13.50 * 
(6.24) 
-13.48 * 
(6.25) 
-14.28 * 
(6.26) 
         
Rival transient ownership       -1.15 
(.99) 
-.04 
(1.17) 
         
Transient ownership x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -3.33 
(11.63) 
Transient ownership squared x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -58.98 
(64.83) 
         
Time dummy variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         
-2 log likelihood 2898 2894 2890 2888 2886 2882 2880 2876 
Wald Chi-Sq 80.4 85.2 90.3 92.8 92.7 101.4 102.9 105.5 
degrees of freedom 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 
 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Post-Hoc Analysis 
A post-hoc analysis, reported in Table 7, addressed the issue of levels. There is an 
extent to which the data examined in this sample are nested within industries because 
firms were intentionally selected to reside in an industry with a rival firm in the same 
industry. Therefore, the data have 72 rivalries and 36 unique industries (i.e., rivalries). 
Estimates obtained in negative binomial regression are based on total correlations, but 
these may or may not be the same as the between-industry and within-industry 
correlations. Therefore, it could be important to control for industry factors that might 
influence the number of strategic actions firms undertake. Some of the existing control 
variables attempt to do so, namely industry growth and concentration. However, there 
may be other, less obvious industry factors affecting the dependent variable and  
biasing the results. One approach to capturing these industry differences is with random 
coefficients modeling. The combination of random coefficients and negative binomial 
modeling is new and is not yet incorporated into most software packages (Hilbe, 2007). 
However, using SAS software, I was able to conduct this analysis with the recently 
developed glimmix procedure. 
In general, the prior results hold in multilevel analysis. These results represent the 
simple strategic action count because the same analysis with the weighted strategic action 
count failed to converge on a solution for any of the models except the controls. In fact, 
the models also failed to converge for the simple strategic action count without imposing 
certain conditions. First, the firm size control variable needed to be operationalized as the 
total number of employees rather than the natural logarithm of the total number of 
employees. Second, the quadratic term needed to be dropped from the analysis. Because  
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TABLE 7  
Random Coefficients Negative Binomial Regression Model with Action Count as DV 
 
N = 682 Model 
 1 2 3 4 
(N/A) 
5 6 7 8 
Financial slack .10 
(.07) 
.09 
(.07) 
.10 
(.07) 
 .11 
(.07) 
.10 
(.07) 
.10 
(.07) 
.10 
(.07) 
Firm performance 2.13 * 
(.98) 
2.62 ** 
(1.02) 
2.26 * 
(1.00) 
 2.29 * 
(1.00) 
2.30 * 
(.99) 
2.28 * 
(.99) 
2.28 * 
(1.00) 
Firm size (num employees) 2.41 * 
(1.19) 
2.59 * 
(1.11) 
2.17 * 
(1.09) 
 2.06 
(1.08) 
2.02 
(1.08) 
1.95 
(1.08) 
1.97 
(1.08) 
CEO compensation 1.27 ** 
(.49) 
1.01 ** 
(.39) 
1.17 ** 
(.39) 
 1.17 ** 
(.39) 
.93 * 
(.40) 
.95 * 
(.40) 
.91 * 
(.40) 
CEO duality .07 
(.09) 
.03 
(.09) 
.02 
(.09) 
 .02 
(.09) 
.05 
(.09) 
.05 
(.09) 
.05 
(.09) 
Industry growth  -.10 
(.19) 
-.04 
(.18) 
-.04 
(.18) 
 -.08 
(.18) 
-.06 
(.18) 
-.06 
(.18) 
-.06 
(.18) 
Industry concentration -.31 
(.45) 
-.30 
(.44) 
-.28 
(.43) 
 -.24 
(.43) 
-.27 
(.43) 
-.29 
(.43) 
-.27 
(.43) 
         
Dedicated ownership  1.53 *** 
(.45) 
1.50 *** 
(.44) 
 1.50 *** 
(.44) 
1.45 *** 
(.44) 
1.49 *** 
(.44) 
1.48 *** 
(.44) 
         
Transient ownership   -1.82*** 
(.55) 
 -1.81*** 
(.55) 
-1.94*** 
(.55) 
-1.92*** 
(.55) 
-1.85*** 
(.55) 
         
Transient ownershp squared     N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
Rival dedicated ownership     -1.41 
(.72) 
-1.17 
(.72) 
-1.18 
(.72) 
-1.22 
(.72) 
         
Dedicated ownership x 
  rival dedicated ownership 
     -15.44** 
(5.85) 
-14.95** 
(5.86) 
-15.37** 
(5.87) 
         
Rival transient ownership       -.76 
(.88) 
-.50 
(.91) 
         
Transient ownership x 
  rival transient ownership 
       -7.29 
(7.10) 
Transient ownership squared x 
  rival transient ownership 
       N/A 
         
Time dummy variables Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
         
-2 log likelihood 2048 1991 1977  1976 1962 1959 1952 
degrees of freedom 16 17 18  20 21 22 24 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
the quadratic term was not statistically significant either as a main effect or in its 
interactions, this should not appreciably influence the results. Incorporating industry 
effects via multilevel analysis reduces the -2 log likelihood of the final model from 3496 
down to 1952, suggesting an improved overall model fit. Taking into account the both 
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intra- and inter-industry variation appears to have made the influence of the ownership 
variables more pronounced and reduced the effects of prior performance, financial slack 
and CEO compensation. The results otherwise are substantively the same: hypotheses 1 
and 4 are supported, while hypotheses 2 and 5 are not.  
 In summary, I analyzed the data in four separate ways, without substantive 
differences in the results. Initial analysis used random-effects negative binomial 
regression with an action count dependent variable. This demonstrated support for 
hypotheses 1 and 4 and also found a direct, negative relationship for hypothesis 2 rather 
than the expected curvilinear relationship. A second analysis used the weighted 
dependent variable, which picked up the influence of financial slack and otherwise 
produced the same results. A third analysis tested both the weighted and unweighted 
dependent variables using fixed effects negative binomial regression (for brevity, 
coefficients were not reported for unweighted). Although the results were similar, the 
model fit was not as good, and a Hausman test revealed the random effects model is 
preferred. A final, post-hoc analysis examined the weighted and unweighted dependent 
variables in a multilevel model. None of these models converged on a solution with the 
weighted dependent variable. Results with the unweighted dependent variable were 
generally as expected, indicating that variation between industries does not change the 
hypothesized relationships in a statistically significant manner. Table 8 summarizes these 
results. 
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TABLE 8  
Summary of Results 
 
Test
 
 Findings
1 
 
Controls:  
1. Financial slack 
2. Past performance 
3. Firm size 
4. CEO compensation 
5. CEO duality 
6. Industry growth 
7. Industry concentration 
  
 
1. Not significant (significant for random effects, weighted DV) 
2. Significant 
3. Significant (except in some multilevel models) 
4. Significant 
5. Not significant 
6. Not significant 
7. Not significant 
   
H1: Dedicated ownership is 
positively associated with strategic 
competitive activity. 
 Supported. 
   
H2: Transient ownership is 
curvilinearly associated with 
strategic competitive activity. 
 Not supported. 
Results showed support for a negative and direct effect. 
   
H3: The relationship between 
dedicated owners and strategic 
competitive activity is moderated by 
owner representation on the board of 
directors. 
 Not tested. 
 
   
H4: The relationship between 
dedicated owners and strategic 
competitive activity is moderated by 
common dedicated ownership. 
 Supported. 
   
H5: The relationship between 
transient owners and strategic 
competitive activity is moderated by 
common transient ownership. 
 Not supported 
 
1 Findings hold for random effects, fixed effects, and multilevel modeling using either a weighted or 
unweighted dependent variable, unless otherwise indicated. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
This dissertation showed a relationship between institutional ownership and 
competitive dynamics, lending support to the increasingly popular notion that many firm 
owners are intricately involved in the life of the firm (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). The results of this dissertation indicate that the reach of 
institutional investors extends beyond firm level strategies, such as diversification and 
compensation (Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Ramaswamy et al., 2002), to affect firm strategic 
actions. Specific types of institutional investors have different effects on the firm’s 
actions, some fostering activity that will benefit the firm in the long run and others 
discouraging it. Institutional investors maintain ownership in a portfolio of firms; this 
study finds that when rivals reside together in that portfolio it affects the relationship 
between the owner and the firms. The following paragraphs discuss the findings of each 
hypothesis in more detail. 
Dedicated institutional investors foster strategic competitive actions among firms 
in their portfolio. This likely owes to their long time horizons and their ability to offer 
patient capital in support of such activity. Strategic competitive actions are difficult to 
implement and have long-term payoffs. For example, General Mills, one of the firms in 
the data set, acquired the worldwide Pillsbury business in October 2001. As a result, 
earnings fell 48 percent in the third quarter of that year. In a 2002 article about the 
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acquisition progress, General Mills’ CEO described the long payout and how it affects 
the rivalry as follows: 
Our transition to a new, combined sales organization handling the entire range of 
Pillsbury and General Mills products resulted in an unusually weak third quarter … 
this one-time disruption is now behind us, as volumes began improving in January 
and grew 3 percent in February … on the one hand our share is up and our sales are 
up. They’re not up as much as Kellogg. I’d have to give Kellogg credit for being the 
strongest performer in the category this year … However, in 2003 we will benefit 
from a full 12 months of the acquired Pillsbury business (Mills, 2002). 
 
Although painful in the short term, General Mills will be in a better position to compete 
with Kellogg over the long run. Dedicated institutional investors appear to have a greater 
tolerance for this kind of strategic competitive activity, and in fact may even be able to 
provide some of the resources necessary to implement such actions. 
Transient institutional investors, on the other hand, are averse to strategic 
competitive actions due to their short investment horizons and the short-term inflexibility 
that often accompanies such actions. The hypothesized relationship was positive and 
curvilinear, but there are some reasonable explanations why the data reveal a direct and 
negative relationship. Transient institutional owners may discourage strategic competitive 
activity by relying on quick entry and exit as their investment strategy. These owners 
favor stock value gains that result from short-term performance improvements, and are 
therefore likely to be concerned about the short-term implications of strategic competitive 
activity. Transient owners often adjust or trade their portfolios on demand and may be 
deterred by announcements about strategic competitive activity that are likely to be 
coupled with negative short-term earnings. They also monitor industry trends and may 
favor firms that do not tend to implement a large number of strategic competitive actions. 
Transient institutional owners maintain primarily short-term holdings, so they will not be 
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involved with a firm long enough to realize the gains associated with strategic 
competitive activity. Therefore, the results indicate that firms with high levels of transient 
ownership tend to avoid such actions. 
The relationship between dedicated institutional investors and strategic 
competitive activity changes when taking into account common ownership between firms 
in a rivalry. Increased dedicated institutional ownership of a firm’s rival does not have a 
direct effect on strategic competitive activity of the focal firm. However, when common 
ownership in the focal firm and the rival firm increase together, firms reduce their level 
of their strategic competitive activity. This relationship indicates that dedicated 
institutional investors adopt a different posture toward firms in which they invest when 
they are also invested in the firm’s rival. Common ownership puts these investors in a 
position where influencing one firm to take action that would increase market share 
would have a negative effect on the firm’s rival, thereby canceling out benefits that 
would accrue to common owners. Further, there are costs associated with imposing 
pressure on firms to engage in strategic competitive activity. These include the campaign 
costs of rallying other owners to impose collective pressure or simply the time and energy 
associated with pressuring managers to take particular actions. Dedicated institutional 
owners are less likely to undertake these costs if one of the firms in their portfolio will 
benefit but another one of their firms will suffer. 
Hypothesis 5 posited the same phenomena would occur with transient institutional 
investors, but results of this study reveal this was not the case. One possible explanation 
emerges from the analysis associated with Hypothesis 2, where results showed that 
transient institutional investors impose pressure on firms to avoid strategic competitive 
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actions that might yield negative short-term earnings. Given their focus on short-term 
earnings, there do not appear to be benefits associated with common ownership of the 
firm’s rival. Influencing firms to limit their strategic competitive activity may provide 
short-term benefits to the firm’s owners, which explains the direct negative relationship 
with transient ownership, but those short-term benefits remain whether or not those 
investors also own shares of the firm’s rival. Another reason the inter-firm governance 
mechanism that arose from common dedicated institutional ownership does not come 
about with common transient owners may be because they do not keep their holdings 
long enough to allow any form of coordination.  
The third hypothesis suggested that the twin governance mechanisms of 
institutional ownership and boards interact with each other. Dedicated institutional 
investors are making more of an effort get their representatives on the boards of firms in 
which they invest. According to FactSet SharkWatch, 30 U.S. firms ceded board seats to 
institutional investors in the first quarter of 2008, increasing from 23 in 2007 and nine in 
2006. Unfortunately, given that this is a limited and more recent phenomenon, the data 
collected for this dissertation did not allow a direct test of owner representation on 
boards.  
Governance and Agency Theory 
The results presented here shed light on agency theory. The control variable of 
CEO compensation shows the expected agency theoretic prediction that as CEOs receive 
more pay (which is tantamount to receiving more stock options), their firms engage in 
more strategic competitive activity. This is because increased stock options make the 
CEO increasingly interested in taking actions that will improve the long-term competitive 
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position of the firm. In agency theory terms, it brings the CEO’s incentives in line with 
those of shareholders. However, distinguishing between different types of shareholders 
reveals that the agency theory prediction is accurate for dedicated institutional investors, 
but not for transient institutional investors. These owners are more interested in short-
term gains, and therefore the CEO’s interests are not at all in line with those of transient 
owners. Recognizing differences in the preferences of heterogeneous shareholders is an 
important boundary condition of agency theory. This may help explain why empirical 
reviews of agency theory often uncover inconsistent results (e.g. Dalton et al., 2003). 
Prior research has found that shareholder differences change agency theory predictions 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003), and this study adds to these arguments by 
providing a finer grain distinction between shareholders. “Pension funds” are typically 
either dedicated institutional investors or quasi-indexers. “Professional investment funds” 
can be on either end of the spectrum – dedicated or transient. Therefore, this study 
captures an additional degree of variance in shareholder differences. 
Another important contribution of this study to agency theory is that the analysis 
dynamically captures principal interests. Agency theory was developed around the notion 
that shareholders have particular interests as a group (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Scholars have also recognized the unique ability of institutional investors to see to it that 
their interests are being served, but have generally considered institutional investors as a 
group with common interests (e.g., Baysinger et al., 1991). Later research extended 
agency theory by recognizing that institutional investors are not all the same and may 
have divergent interests (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003). These studies 
added to our understanding of agency relationships by revealing that different legal forms 
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of institutional ownership operate under unique fiduciary standards, with different types 
of competitive pressures and varying sensitivity to current performance. This dissertation 
further refines our understanding of these differences as it recognizes variation in terms 
of investment horizons and trading sensitivity that occurs within legal forms.  
Further, institutional investors might change over time. This study does not 
categorize investors at the beginning of the sampling window, but instead categorizes 
institutional investors each year. Only one institutional investor, Friess Associates, was 
categorized as transient for the duration of the sampling window. Similarly, only one 
institutional investor, Capital Research and Management Company, was categorized as 
dedicated for the entire ten years. Most others occasionally moved between transient and 
quasi-indexer or dedicated and quasi-indexer. This analysis captured these differences 
and thus provided a more dynamic and homogeneous view of the interests of principals. 
An example is Ed Lampert’s hedge fund, ESL Investments. For most of the years in the 
sample this fund was classified as dedicated. However, in 2003 ESL cut their stake in 
Autozone, one of the firms in the data set, by 20 percent, causing Autozone’s stock to 
plummet. As a result of higher portfolio turnover, ESL Investments was not classified as 
a dedicated institutional investor starting in 2003. 
Capturing the dynamic interests of principals changes our understanding of 
agency theory in at least two ways. First, it changes the nature of the agency problem. 
Agency theory has always suggested the agency “problem” of misaligned interests 
between shareholders and managers arises due to managerial opportunism. In their recent 
review of agency theory, Dalton et al. (2008: 1) note “the central tenet of agency theory is 
that there is potential for mischief when the interests of owners and those of managers 
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diverge.” However, this dissertation adds that interests may diverge owing to problems 
with shareholders, not only managerial mischief. Agency theory assumes that 
shareholders have the best interests of the firm at heart, but these results demonstrate this 
is not always the case. Transient institutional investors clearly discourage firms from 
taking actions that may be important to the long-term health and success of the firm. 
Concerned more about short-term implications of strategic competitive actions, these 
investors don’t appear to be concerned about the firm’s long-term interests and 
stakeholders. Even dedicated institutional investors, although generally concerned with 
the firm’s long-term competitiveness, have those interests taper off when they own 
significant portions of both a firm and its rival. The agency problem, therefore, is not 
only that managerial interests have gone awry but that principal interests may have done 
so. Agency theorists might suggest that owners may have whatever interests they desire, 
but in the context of firm governance scholars may need to consider how agency theory 
changes when owners can have destructive interests. As a result, agency theory in this 
context might address not only managerial opportunism, but principal opportunism as 
well. 
Second, this study moves the focus of interest alignment from agents to 
principals. Agency theoretic prescriptions generally seek to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers via contracts and incentives imposed on the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This study, however, shows that principal interests are a moving 
target. The composition of a firm’s ownership is not consistent over time, and in fact 
agents (i.e., managers) are a much more stable group. Therefore, to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers, the literature would benefit from more of a focus on 
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shareholders. For example, firms might “court” the right investors and in so doing 
attempt to gather a more consistent and homogenous group of owners. The voluminous 
research on agency theory operates almost exclusively from the perspective of aligning 
interests by changing how managers are monitored, compensated, or disciplined by the 
market (Dalton et al., 2008), Scholars have devoted little attention to how such 
mechanisms may be ineffective given that the interests of principals are dynamic. This 
study highlights the importance of the shareholder side of alignment, finding that 
shareholders are a heterogeneous and dynamic group with respect to what they are 
looking for out of firms in which they invest. 
There are further implications for corporate governance that arise from this study. 
Prior research has found that firm owners play a role in establishing corporate-level 
strategies and are therefore an important dimension of corporate governance (e.g. 
Baysinger et al., 1991; Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). The results reported here add that 
firm owners not only influence broad strategies but appear to be involved at a deeper 
level, influencing the extent to which firms undertake strategic actions. Institutional 
investors do not just occasionally direct firms in their portfolio to move in this or that 
overall direction, but instead appear to interact with firms regularly enough to affect their 
strategic competitive activity. This suggests that institutional investors understand and 
have opinions about firms in their portfolio at the behavioral level, and they impose those 
opinions on the firm’s managers. 
Competitive Dynamics 
This study extends our understanding of competitive dynamics, and in particular 
of competition in dyadic rivalries. Rivalrous competition has garnered significant 
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research attention because firms have a single main competitor and share the same 
resource factor markets and general environments, thereby isolating external influences 
on competitive dynamics between the firms (Chen et al., 2007). Prior research has 
delineated the factors that make rivals more aware and more capable of competitive 
activity (Ferrier, 2001; Yu & Cannella, 2007), but this study adds an important factor that 
contributes to the firm’s motivation to compete. The literature on what motivates firms to 
compete has generally focused on external factors, such as market commonality (Chen, 
1996) and rival attack volume (Ferrier, 2001), with internal factors receiving less 
scholarly attention (Offstein & Gnyawali, 2005). This study has presented a number of 
factors of why governance structures may be a strong force influencing firms to compete 
or not compete. The results reported here confirm these arguments, showing that 
institutional investors are a powerful motivator, driving rivalrous firms to undertake, or 
not undertake, strategic competitive actions.  
Another contribution to the literature on competitive dynamics from this research 
is the identification of an alternative mechanism for mutual forbearance. Strategic 
management and marketing researchers have developed the notion of mutual forbearance 
as tacit collusion between rival firms with the understanding that breaking the tacit 
agreement would bring harm to both firms together (Baum & Korn, 1996, 1999; 
Feinberg, 1984). Theorizing and empirical research on mutual forbearance has 
emphasized multimarket competition as the primary mechanism by which mutual 
forbearance occurs (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Gimeno, 1999). The results of this 
study point to the governance structure of firms in a rivalry as an alternative mechanism 
by which mutual forbearance may occur. In particular, results reveal the presence of an 
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inter-firm governance structure that emerges when dedicated institutional investors 
acquire large shares of both firms in a rivalry. Whereas governance researchers have 
established the influence of concentrated ownership on firms, this study finds evidence 
for the influence of common ownership on competition between firms. 
Hypothesis 4 describes a phenomenon that is best understood using mutual 
forbearance arguments. However, this is not the same as finding evidence of collusion. It 
is important to recognize that the hypothesis states the influence of dedicated institutional 
investors is lessened when common ownership of the rival is high. We may view this as 
mutual forbearance in the sense that common ownership brings about reduced 
competitive activity between firms, but this does not at all suggest that firms actively 
pursue a program of tacit collusion or, worse, coordinated price increases. The mutual 
forbearance implications of this research are limited to the extent to which firm owners 
influence strategic competitive activity. This may simply reflect differences in the 
pressure that owners apply to each of the firms in turn, rather than any collusion on the 
part of firms that they own. 
A final implication of this study for competitive dynamics researchers is that 
some owners may force firms into competitive myopia. Results indicate that transient 
institutional owners discourage strategic competitive activity, which is tantamount to 
limiting the range of competitive options available to firms. Transient investors use the 
threat of exit to pressure firms to consider only those competitive actions that would not 
result in short-term earnings shortfalls. As a result, managers in firms dominated by 
transient institutional investors do not have a full arsenal of competitive actions available 
to them. Over the long-term, the deck will be stacked against them. As they continually 
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strive to meet quarterly earnings expectations, their focus becomes increasingly narrow 
because they cannot consider the broad range of strategic actions that may be necessary 
for the firm to compete over time. This focus on a smaller range of actions means the 
firm will likely have less diversity in their competitive repertoire and be more predictable 
because they are unable to experiment with new forms of strategic competitive actions. 
Therefore, the short time horizon of transient institutional investors may have far-
reaching implications for the breadth of a firm’s competitive activity. 
Implications for Practice 
 Institutional investors play a central role in the life of publicly traded firms. Many 
researchers have lauded the involvement of institutional investors, pointing to successes 
where such investors have influenced firms to undergo change that has turned around 
their performance (Dvorak & Lublin, 2008). Others, however, have argued that 
institutional investors lack governance skills (Prowse, 1991), suggesting the myopic 
concerns of shareholders makes them poor overseers of firm actions (Bushee, 1998). This 
dissertation helps evaluate the governance effectiveness of institutional investors, and has 
wide reaching implications for managers, directors, and shareholders. 
 “Management’s primary obligation is to maximize shareholder value.” This 
doctrine is instilled in business school students starting from their first management class 
and has gained secure status as a worthy explanation of the ultimate goal of managers. 
Until recent decades, this philosophy was more or less in sync with reality because 
owners held their shares for many years. However, the average shareholding period of 
institutional owners has been steadily declining (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). For the firms 
in this data set shares were held, on average, less than one year. Maximizing shareholder 
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value within the year is often inconsistent with maximizing long-term value for the firm. 
Managers, therefore, should recognize their primary obligation is to stakeholders whose 
interests coincide with long-term prospects of the firm. Instead, managers should 
consider how they might re-orient their objectives toward long-term value, and worry 
about maximizing shareholder value only when shareholders demonstrate they are serious 
about supplying patient capital.  
 Another implication for managers is that this study seems to indicate there are 
“right” and “wrong” investors. Common wisdom suggests that any investor is a good 
investor, but these results show that some investors will be better for the long-term health 
of a firm than others. Managers, therefore, may wish to take action to woo the right 
investors. There are some recent examples of firms trying to accomplish this. For 
example, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, Gillette and AT&T have all stopped issuing quarterly 
earnings reports because management felt they were drawing attention away from long-
term strategy (Bushee, 2004). Managers also might also consider the content of their 
public disclosures. To attract the right investors, managers might focus disclosure activity 
on information that helps investors monitor long-term prospects rather than earnings 
forecasts that may invite speculative trading from transient institutional investors. 
 Shareholders may find the results of this study useful in balancing their portfolio 
of firms. Dedicated institutional investors are unlikely to be surprised by results showing 
they influence the strategic competitive activity of firms. These investors often gain 
experience in turning around a particular type of firm. For example, Nelson Peltz’s Trian 
Fund Management is a dedicated institutional investor that purchased large stakes in food 
industry firms Cadbury Schweppes and Kraft. Mr. Peltz leveraged his own experience in 
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the food industry to help each of these firms become more profitable. He was successful 
because the three companies each serve different niches within the food industry. 
However, such investors should realize that investing in firms that are in direct 
competition with each other will diminish their ability to govern, because helping one 
firm may have an opposing negative influence on another firm in their portfolio. 
Public Policy and Societal Implications 
 The results of this study may also have important implications for public policy. 
Several Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations place limitations on the 
means by which institutional investors can impose pressure on firms in which they invest. 
Institutional investors have pressed for reforms to relax some of these standards with 
some success. This study shows that yielding greater leeway to the challenges 
institutional investors pose to firms may have mixed results, because institutional 
investors have varying motives. It is fair to ask, however, why SEC regulations should 
apply to all institutional investors as a group. Regulations could be drafted that address 
the needs of particular types of investors. For example, institutional investors that 
demonstrate their commitment to the long-term health of a firm by holding a significant 
number of shares over time might gain unique privileges with respect to their ability to 
influence firm actions.  
This runs counter to the prevailing SEC philosophy, which sees the separation of 
shareholder power and managerial power as foundational to American capitalism. The 
governance of U.S. firms is built on the democratic system of one-share, one-vote, but 
this study suggests that such a system may not be as equitable as it sounds on the surface. 
Owners that purchase shares and intend to quickly release them at the first earnings 
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disappointment have the same voting power as those who have demonstrated 
commitment to the firm over time. This seems unfair to those who are trying to 
implement positive long-term change. There is little reason to provide the same power to 
influence firms to all owners. Perhaps the SEC need not consider such power to be a right 
conferred upon every owner, but rather a privilege doled out increasingly to owners as 
they show their interests are aligned with those of the firm. In this sense, recognizing the 
possibility of principal opportunism, the SEC would be using a reward system to bring 
the interests of owners in line with those of the firm. 
The findings of this dissertation in support of Hypothesis 4 are also likely to be 
important to policymakers. SEC regulations do not currently regulate the impact of 
owning large shares of competitive rivals. This study shows there are implications to such 
forms of ownership as it diminishes the ability of otherwise good governance from 
institutional investors. Many SEC rules are based on agency theory, and this study adds 
that agents may not be acting independently of one another if they have a common 
principal. Recognizing this and regulating common ownership would place restrictions 
on an institutional investor’s ability to invest in an entire industry, which would have 
particularly strong implications for funds that specialize in certain industries.  
These results may even have broader implications for society at large. We often 
view firms as separate entities and have built our towns and cities around the notion that 
when firms compete, the public benefits. However, the visible network of competing 
firms belies a hidden structure of ownership that can influence the way these firms 
compete. This structure is both changing and non-obvious to consumers and individual 
investors. Walking into Circuit City in 2004, consumers might be alarmed to learn that 
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dedicated institutional investors owning more than 23% of the company also own large 
stakes in Best Buy. Perhaps of even more concern would be the high levels of common 
dedicated institutional ownership that exist between Cardinal Health and McKesson in 
the drug industry or between Aflac and Unum in insurance. In an age when investors 
were more passive, this kind of ownership structure may have been acceptable. However, 
given the increasing influence of institutional investors, common ownership could have a 
deleterious effect on the ability of capitalism to function as it should. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are some limitations of note to this dissertation. In operationalizing 
competitive activity, it was necessary to leverage the commonly understood distinction 
between tactical and strategic competitive actions (Porter, 1980) because shareholders are 
more likely to affect strategic actions, and in fact may be unable to significantly affect 
tactical actions. While many empirical studies in the competitive dynamics literature 
recognize this distinction, they typically operationalize tactical, not strategic, competitive 
actions (Ketchen et al., 2004). The approach used here relies on the well accepted 
practice of headline searches of the business press using Lexis-Nexis (Derfus et al., 2008; 
Ferrier et al., 1999). I combined this with Smith et al.’s (1992) definition to identify those 
articles that describe strategic competitive actions and Chen and Macmillan’s (1992) 
description of irreversibility to weight those actions. This resulted in a highly meaningful 
dependent variable that emerged from a broad view of the life of the firm over the 
sampling window, but it necessarily incorporates some judgments as to what constitutes a 
strategic competitive action and how irreversible is each action.  
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In addition, by using a dependent variable focused on competitive activity, this 
dissertation does not address the relative merits of implementing such activity. We may 
draw conclusions from the results about the extent to which owners influence firms to 
engage or not engage in strategic competitive activity, but those conclusions cannot be 
extended with respect to their ultimate influence on firm performance. Future research 
might consider the extent to which different types of shareholders benefit firms in their 
portfolio by fostering strategic activity that adds value. 
The analysis presented here considered aggregate competitive activity of the focal 
firm as the dependent variable (i.e., annual count of strategic competitive actions). An 
important extension of this work will be to consider responses and response times of rival 
firms. Doing so would facilitate consideration not only of a firm’s activity but also how 
governance structures facilitate or hinder the firm’s ability to deter rival activity. In 
competitive dynamics research, initiation of competitive activity is an important 
dependent variable (Yu et al., 2007), but scholars might provide a more complete picture 
of the influence of institutional owners on the rivalry by examining how they affect the 
speed and diversity of firm responses. Another consideration with respect to the 
dependent variable is that the analysis of this dissertation concludes with strategic 
competitive activity. Future research might consider the ultimate outcomes of these 
strategic competitive actions. It would be interesting, for example, to delineate between 
strategic competitive actions initiated at the behest of institutional investors compared to 
those initiated by the firm and compare the long-term performance implications of these 
different types of actions. 
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Further, this study examined institutional owners and their portfolio of firms, but 
did not incorporate the historical experience of firm owners with respect to how they 
influence other firms in their portfolio. Future research may add this dimension to help 
explain the extent to which institutional investors learn from their ownership experience 
and, possibly, bring that knowledge to other firms in their portfolio. Actions taken by 
dedicated institutional investors such as Nelson Peltz and Robert Whitworth, who have 
encouraged considerable change in a variety of firms, provide anecdotal evidence of 
institutional investors leveraging their experience to place pressure on firms. As 
dedicated institutional investors have success turning around firms in their portfolio, they 
may seek out firms where they could leverage that experience. This may have positive 
results, or it may reveal the emergence of institutional investor hubris. Having 
successfully turned around the performance of one firm, institutional investors may seek 
to apply the same principles to other firms without fully understanding the context.  
The sample was based on the large firms. Institutional investors are likely to be 
most concerned with the actions of the largest firms in their portfolio. However, there are 
rivalries in industries that do not include any Fortune 500 firms and the level of 
involvement of institutional owners may vary in such rivalries. In fact, there are also 
rivalries in very small and even emerging industries. The risks and rewards of strategic 
competitive activity in such industries are likely to be more pronounced, and therefore the 
role of institutional investors may change. Using SIC codes to delineate industries may 
also have hidden some common sense rivalries. For example, DirecTV and Echostar are 
obvious competitive rivals in the satellite television business, but SIC 4811is diluted by a 
variety of cable television providers.  
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The sample was also based on domestic firms. This facilitated analysis because 
ownership and board data were more readily available and competitive activity was easier 
to identify. However, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are likely to impose a host of 
different criteria on the hypothesized relationships. From an international perspective, 
institutional owners may be domestic or foreign, which would likely affect their ability to 
influence firm actions. MNEs vary in the extent of their globalization. As competitive 
rivals operate against each other in fewer global markets, it may be that common 
dedicated institutional ownership has less of a deleterious effect on firm governance. 
Future research could explore how MNE internationalization changes the way firm 
owners influence strategic competitive activity. A related line of research might also 
consider how institutional owners from other countries influence strategic competitive 
activity in the host country. Lastly, scholars might also examine the international nature 
of strategic competitive actions. For example, as institutional owners gain experience 
with investment in firms engaging in competitive activity overseas, do they bring that 
experience to other firms in the portfolio? 
This study separately considers the influence of institutional investor types, but 
there are likely to be some important interactions between types. For example, in early 
2008 Wellington Management and TCW Group, both dedicated institutional investors, 
each sold a 10% stake in Circuit City, one of the firms in the data set. Shortly thereafter 
one transient institutional investor, Maverick Capital, followed suit, selling its 5% stake 
while another transient institutional investor, D.E. Shaw, bought into a 3% stake. It is 
unclear how the entrance and exit of one type of investor influences other types of 
investors. However, such massive rotation of equity is likely to influence the ability of 
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the firm to compete and survive. Future research might examine how the movements of 
dedicated institutional investors affect actions by transient institutional investors and 
vice-versa, and how these work together to affect a firm’s competitive posture. 
A final avenue for future research might be to consider how firm ownership 
interacts with other forms of governance to affect strategic competitive activity. H3, 
which was not measured, could be analyzed by using a matched-pair analysis to capture 
those firms that do have directors with vested interests toward a specific institutional 
investor. These results could be expanded to examine how other aspects of the board of 
directors interact with the firm’s owners to influence firm actions. For example, 
institutional owners may change the nature of the interlocking directorate and how it 
affects firm governance. Similarly, institutional ownership and executive compensation 
may work together to create particularly strong, or weak, governance structures. Different 
types of owners may also influence the effectiveness of the market for corporate control 
as a governance mechanism. 
  
89 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 
The present findings add value to our understanding of corporate governance, 
indicating that institutional investors can and do affect the strategic competitive actions of 
firms in their portfolio. Different types of investors are heterogeneous in their preferences 
and involvement in firm’s strategic competitive activity. This study classified 
institutional investors based on their time horizons, trading sensitivity, and ownership 
stakes, focusing on two ends of the extreme: dedicated investors have concentrated stakes 
in a buy-and-hold strategy and transient investors have diversified holdings and higher 
turnover. Results show dedicated institutional investors foster strategic competitive 
activity whereas transient institutional investors appear to discourage it.  
There are, however, factors that change the nature of these relationships. When 
the board of directors of the focal firm is more independent, dedicated institutional 
investors are better able to impose pressure on firms to engage in strategic competitive 
activity. On the other hand, when dedicated institutional investors own large stakes in 
both the focal firm and its rival, they lessen pressure to engage in strategic competitive 
activity. This points to an inter-firm governance structure that influences strategic 
competitive activity. 
These results have broad implications for both theory and practice. For agency 
theory, this study demonstrates the dynamic nature of principal interests and shifts the 
source of the agency problem from managerial opportunism to principal opportunism. 
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For the competitive dynamics literature, the results presented here reveal a powerful 
motivating force on the competitive activity of firms and also introduce a new 
mechanism for mutual forbearance.  Lastly, managers and policymakers alike will take 
interest in these results as they uncover important relationships governing the way rivals 
compete. 
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